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SOCIAL CHANGE, AND FACT-BASED ADJUDICATION
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This Article offers an account of how courts respond to social change,
with a specific focus on the process by which courts “tip” from one understanding of a social group and its constitutional claims to another. Adjudication of equal protection and due process claims, in particular, requires
courts to make normative judgments regarding the effect of traits such as
race, sex, sexual orientation, or mental retardation on group members’ status
and capacity. Yet, Professor Goldberg argues, courts commonly approach
decisionmaking by focusing only on the “facts” about a social group, an
approach that she terms “fact-based adjudication.” Professor Goldberg critiques this approach for its flawed premise that restrictions on social groups
can be evaluated based on facts alone and its role in obscuring judicial
involvement in selecting among competing norms.
The Article also observes that because fact-based adjudication enables
courts to leave norms unacknowledged, it does serve the judiciary’s institutional interests by maximizing flexibility for future decisionmaking regarding
restrictions on group members’ rights. At the same time, however, this approach facilitates inconsistency in theory and outcome by enabling courts to
variously embrace and reject traditional rationales for restricting social
groups without having to justify the inconsistent treatment of group-related
norms. As a possible remedy for these flaws, the Article considers the costs
and benefits of greater judicial candor regarding the normative underpin* Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. I am especially
grateful to Henry Monaghan for ongoing conversation about the issues in this Article as
well as to Michelle Adams, Mary Anne Case, Ariela Dubler, William Eskridge, Richard
Fallon, Gary Francione, Charles Fried, Richard Goldberg, Lani Guinier, Philip
Hamburger, Ian Haney-Lopez, Edward Hartnett, Nan Hunter, Pamela Karlan, Michael
Klarman, John Leubsdorf, James Liebman, Tamara Lothian, Michael McConnell, Gillian
Metzger, Martha Minow, Rachel Moran, James Gray Pope, Richard Primus, Catherine
Sharkey, Peter Strauss, Susan Sturm, Kendall Thomas, Jeremy Waldron, Mark Weiner, and
Robin West, and to the participants in the Harvard Constitutional Law Workshop, the
faculty workshops at Columbia, Fordham, Brooklyn, Hofstra, and Rutgers-Newark Law
Schools, and the LGBT Law Faculty Workshop of Greater New York. My thanks, as well, to
Todd Anten and Wilson Meeks for outstanding research assistance, to Rachel Rubenson of
the Columbia Law Review for editorial suggestions, and to the Dean’s Research Fund of
Rutgers-Newark Law School for financial support.

1955

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100100

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

1956

unknown

Seq: 2

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

20-NOV-06

13:58

[Vol. 106:1955

ning of decisions. Although Professor Goldberg ultimately advocates only a
limited modification to the current fact-based adjudication regime, she concludes that our theories of judicial review will improve, both with respect to
descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the extent they recognize the inevitable judicial involvement in making normative judgments about social
groups.
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“Courts . . . do not sit or act in a social vacuum. . . . [W]hat
once was a “natural” and “self-evident” ordering later comes to
be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and freedom.”1
— Justice Thurgood Marshall
“Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and
natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history
there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and
white.”2
— Justice John Paul Stevens
INTRODUCTION
To paraphrase Alexis de Tocqueville, there is hardly a social conflict
in the United States that does not eventually land in court.3 Consequently, there is hardly a court that can avoid shaping social conflicts.
Equal protection and due process claims, in particular, directly solicit judicial intervention in disputes regarding the status of social groups.4
Judges faced with these claims must then determine what, if anything,
justifies singling out group members for legal burdens.
To make this determination, courts evaluate prevailing normative
judgments regarding group members’ status or capacity. When the
norms are largely settled, this aspect of the judicial role tends to go unnoticed. But where longstanding judgments regarding a group have become destabilized and new norms have yet to be settled, courts’ involvement in selecting between “old” and “new” norms produces anxieties
regarding the judicial role in responding to societal change.
At this moment, these anxieties manifest most prominently in litigation by lesbian and gay couples seeking to marry. The lawsuits maintain
that, as a result of societal change, negative views of gay people that once
justified discriminatory government action must now be rejected as impermissible and hostility-laden. States defending the exclusion of gay
couples from marriage contend, conversely, that the traditional rationales
remain valid. Unavoidably, then, courts must revisit longstanding norms
regarding same-sex couples to render their decisions.5
1. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 280 (Phillips Bradley & Francis
Bowen eds., Henry Reeve trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1835).
4. See infra note 6 for discussion of the use of the term “social group” here.
5. Some of these judges have found it “eminently rational for the Legislature to
postpone making fundamental changes to [the different-sex couple requirement for
marriage] until such time as there is unanimous scientific evidence, or popular consensus,
or both, that such changes can safely be made.” Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 1003 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting); see also Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d
259, 266–67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (citing cases from numerous states to
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Yet, as this Article will show, when views about a social group are in
flux, as is the case for lesbians and gay men today, courts deciding equal
protection and due process cases go to great lengths to avoid acknowledging their central role in substantiating either the “old” or the “new”
norm. This practice of obfuscating the judicial role in norm selection
can be seen as well in cases regarding social groups defined by sex, race,
or other characteristics,6 where courts have had to decide whether sociedemonstrate absence of public consensus favoring marriage rights for same-sex couples),
rev’d, No. A-68-05, 2006 N.J. LEXIS 1251 (Oct. 25, 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d
338, 359 (2006) (stating that legislature could rationally restrict marriage to opposite-sex
couples because “[i]ntuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having
before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a woman are like”).
Others, by contrast, have concluded that prohibiting gay couples from marrying
“cannot plausibly further” a state’s aim of “ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing”
in light of changing demographics and laws recognizing that “people in same-sex couples
may be ‘excellent’ parents.” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961–63 (majority opinion); see also
Lewis, 875 A.2d at 289–90 (Collester, J., dissenting) (finding that state’s claimed interest in
procreation was not rational because same-sex couples’ marriages will not reduce birth rate
or number of heterosexual couples’ marriages); Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 394 (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing approvingly amicus briefs noting studies that conclude that “children
raised by same-sex parents fare no differently from, and do as well as, those raised by
opposite-sex parents in terms of the quality of the parent-child relationship and the mental
health, development and social adjustment of the child”); id. at 396 (“[T]his Court cannot
avoid its obligation to remedy constitutional violations in the hope that the Legislature
might some day render the question presented academic.”).
The Vermont Supreme Court likewise concluded that same-sex and different-sex
couples were similarly situated with respect to their need for security for their children.
See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). The legislature did not extend marriage
to same-sex couples and instead adopted a civil union statute that provided parity of rights
and benefits within Vermont for gay and nongay couples. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72,
72–88 (codified at Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201–1207 (2002)). For a defense of this type of
balancing approach, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance:
Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1021, 1025–26
(2004).
The New Jersey Supreme Court, by contrast, declined even to consider rationales
related to child-rearing that had been advanced by amici. Lewis, 2006 N.J. LEXIS 1521, at
*29 n.6, *35–*36 & n.7 (noting that state had disclaimed procreation and parentingrelated rationales). Yet it, too, indicated its awareness of norm changes as a result of
societal change. “Times and attitudes have changed,” the court observed, adding that
“there has been a developing understanding that discrimination against gays and lesbians
is no longer acceptable in this State.” Id. at *45–*46.
6. By social group, I mean to encompass individuals who are perceived by others to
share a deeply-rooted, identity-defining trait. In some contexts, the contours of social
groups extend more broadly to include individuals joined by political opinion, profession
or trade, or shared activities. See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st
Cir. 1985) (defining “particular social group” in asylum law context as comprising persons
of “similar background, habits or social status”). Here, however, I am interested in
groupings defined by a trait, such as sex, race, sexual orientation, or mental retardation,
among others, that is (or historically has been) perceived to affect group members’
capacity to participate in or contribute to society. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (discussing judicial review of classifications based on
characteristics that “frequently bear[ ] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society”).
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tal change had destabilized once acceptable views regarding group members. These cases, like the marriage cases, turn on the question whether
traditional justifications for unequal treatment remain legitimate.
This Article presents a model of fact-based adjudication as an account of how courts intervene in conflicts regarding popular views of social groups and, at times, “tip” from one understanding of a social group
and its constitutional claims to another.7 The model explains how and
why courts tend to focus on facts and avoid acknowledging the normative
judgments related to those facts when adjudicating equal protection and
due process claims that implicate the status of social groups. In addition
to the model’s immediate significance for courts and advocates enmeshed in civil rights litigation involving social groups, the arguments
One could argue that the operative category here should focus not on shared traits
but on common conduct, shared sensibilities, or life experiences that differentiate group
members from others. On the other hand, because normative judgments about group
members tend to inform normative judgments about group members’ conduct and
capacity, and vice versa, the distinction between popular views about a group and views
about issues or conduct related to that group tends to be fuzzy. The tradition of regulating
conduct as a means of regulating group members illustrates this lack of clarity. Cf.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (recognizing that Texas’s regulation of
“homosexual conduct” distinctly affected lesbians and gay men); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (finding that regulation barring individuals residing
with other unrelated individuals from receiving food stamps targeted “hippies”). Because
group members bear the brunt of regulation—whether the regulation explicitly targets
conduct or a trait—I find the social group category, even with its imperfections, the most
useful frame for getting at the process by which courts absorb social change related to
subpopulations and the issues affiliated with them.
7. The concept of fact-based adjudication developed here is likely to have some
application to adjudication involving changes to attitudes, practices, and technology that
are not related directly to constitutional claims made by social groups. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–64 (1992) (discussing reliance on
shifting conceptions of fact during and after Lochner era); see also Alafair S. Burke,
Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1043, 1048, 1052–53 (2005) (book
review) (discussing ways in which normative views of reasonableness shape empirical
observations made in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). In other contexts, including
many private law disputes, normative judgments regarding relevant facts tend to be less
enmeshed in popular debate, and the analysis that follows, while still relevant, may be of
more limited use. See infra note 157 (discussing norm choices underlying conflict related
to application of maritime law).
Further, the analysis here regarding the judicial response to social groups’
constitutional claims takes place within a larger conversation about the relationship
between courts and societal change. The common law, for example, has long embodied
the expectation that courts will take account of change in developing legal principles. See
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933) (“[T]he common law is not immutable but
flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”); see also Guido
Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 3–4 (1982) [hereinafter Calabresi,
Common Law] (describing common law courts as “principal instruments” for “balanc[ing]
the need for continuity and change”). Likewise, strong arguments have been advanced
that courts should take societal change into account in statutory interpretation. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994). Applications of the
theories here to these other contexts will be left to another day.
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related to it join the theoretical debate8 over the capacity of courts to
assimilate social change without usurping the legislature’s prerogative to
reflect the people’s will.9

8. These debates, as well as this Article, proceed on the background assumption that
courts’ decisions remain roughly within parameters acceptable to the surrounding society.
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2596,
2606 (2003) (“[J]udicial decisions rest within a range of acceptability to a majority of the
people.”); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 (2003)
(“[C]onstitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture.”); see also Steven G.
Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269, 272 (1993) (“Mr. Dooley’s dictum
about the Supreme Court’s tendency to follow the election returns seems no less apt today
than when it was first printed almost a century ago.”). But cf. Scott Douglas Gerber, First
Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas (1999) (describing Justice Thomas’s
jurisprudence as rejecting dialectic relationship between courts and society while striving
instead to discern and apply framers’ original principles).
While the concern with the countermajoritarian difficulty is a perennial one, the
relative finality of constitutional adjudication heightens it in ways that statutory
interpretation and common law adjudication do not. See, e.g., Calabresi, Common Law,
supra note 7, at 4 (“The incremental nature of common law adjudication meant that no
single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so over
time and in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people.”); Judith S.
Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes
and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1995) (“Outside the area of constitutional
adjudication, state court decisions ‘are subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary
statute.’ . . . But when a case is decided on constitutional grounds, the court solidifies the
law in ways that may not be as susceptible to subsequent modification either by courts or by
legislatures.” (quoting John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 4 (1980))).
9. Within this debate, the relationship between judicial capacity and judicial review is
itself contested. For example, popular constitutionalists, including Larry Kramer and Mark
Tushnet, have broadly rejected judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation and
contend that courts lack both the accountability and competence to constitutionalize
determinations about contested social issues, such as the exclusion of gay couples from
marriage. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism
and Judicial Review (2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
(1999); see also Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999); Adrian Vermeule,
Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1557 (2002).
David Strauss’s common law approach of “rational traditionalism,” on the other hand,
recommends that courts act carefully and incrementally rather than with categorical
restraint. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 877 passim (1996). Strauss explains that courts “should think twice about . . .
judgments of right and wrong when they are inconsistent with what has gone before,” and
that rejection of tradition is justified when, “on reflection, we are sufficiently confident that
we are right, and . . . the stakes are high enough.” Id. at 896–97. His theory provides few
specifics, however, and addresses only in general terms how courts gauge whether they are
acting with sufficient caution.
Robert Post’s invocation of Louis Brandeis to suggest the centrality of “practical tact
and judgment” to preserve legal authority also reflects awareness of the tension
experienced by courts asked to absorb societal change but similarly does not offer a
specific prescription for or a descriptive model of decisionmaking under these
circumstances. Post, supra note 8, at 109.
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The core claim here is that courts10 are inescapably involved in absorbing, evaluating, and influencing changes to popular judgments regarding social groups yet have adopted an approach to decisionmaking
that obfuscates that role. Particularly when normative judgments about a
group are in flux in the surrounding society, judicial review of government burdens on social groups tends to focus exclusively on facts about
group members. Through this decisionmaking technique, which I term
fact-based adjudication, courts cite facts about the group as the reason
either for revising group members’ constitutional rights or for affirming
the status quo.11 Normative judgments about group members, which are
necessary to make sense of both the stated facts and the legal reasoning,
remain unmentioned. Only later, if group-related norms become more
settled, do courts acknowledge the normative judgments about group
members that were implicit in their earlier decisions.12
Brown v. Board of Education 13 provides a striking example of this adjudicative method. While the decision is widely treated as having rejected
the negative normative judgments about African Americans that previously had justified racial segregation, the Court’s opinion never actually
discussed, much less condemned, those norms. Instead, it cited to “modern authority” regarding race discrimination’s harmful effects on educational opportunities as the reason for requiring desegregation.14 Judicial
approaches to sex equality in the early 1970s similarly held that “new” or
changed facts required a break with the normative view that women were
less capable in the public sphere than men—yet the decisions unquestionably forged new normative ground.15 So, too, the Court framed its
invalidation of Colorado’s bar on antidiscrimination protections for gay
people as fact driven and did not address the normative judgment
(“moral disapproval of homosexual conduct”) advanced by the dissent to
justify Colorado’s restriction.16
10. Although the discussion below focuses heavily on U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence, with some inclusion of state and lower federal court rulings, much of the
analysis applies to all courts charged with adjudicating social change-based claims
regarding social groups.
11. As will be explained shortly, the distinction between fact and norm is drawn here
for heuristic purposes rather than to suggest a fundamental difference between the two.
See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
12. This analysis rests on the belief that constitutional adjudication in the areas I
consider involves a “gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.” Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877). The decisions below demonstrate this evolutionary
theory’s descriptive validity and set the foundation for my scrutiny of how social groups fit
within the evolutionary process. A normative defense of constitutional adjudication as an
evolving process rather than as fixed and determined exclusively by text and/or history is
beyond this Article’s scope.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Id. at 494; see also infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 93–96.
16. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–36 (1996); id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The majority pinned its holding on the lack of factual connection between Colorado’s ban

R
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While this fact-based decisionmaking strategy has many appeals, its
theoretical foundations are shaky at best. Facts alone do not supply the
judgment necessary to decide whether a legal burden on a social group is
reasonable. As David Hume famously put the point, an “ought” cannot
be derived from an “is.”17 The fact that women tend to have primary
childcare responsibilities, for example, does not itself determine whether
a law that distinguishes between men and women is reasonable. Instead,
courts charged with evaluating sex-based restrictions must make normative judgments about the relevance of gendered childcare roles or other
(purported) factual differences between men and women. The same is
true for evaluation of restrictions on other social groups. Simply put, the
judicial focus on facts and the elision of normative judgments obscures,
but does not eliminate, the influence of social norms on both analysis
and outcomes.18
To be sure, the distinction between norms and facts should not be
overstated, even as it provides a useful heuristic for examining the decisionmaking dynamic here.19 Facts, as well as norms, are inevitably theoryand the government’s alleged interests in protecting associational freedom and scarce
governmental resources. Id. at 630–31 (majority opinion). For further discussion of Romer
as an example of fact-based adjudication, see text accompanying infra notes 97–101.
17. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469–70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H.
Nidditch eds., Oxford 2d ed. 1978) (1739).
18. This form of reasoning from fact directly to judgment, without analysis of the
norms at issue, allows for incompletely theorized decisions as well as the operation of
inchoate, unconscious, or ill-formulated norms, as will be discussed infra. For extended
discussion of undertheorized decisions, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court,
1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 20–21 (1996)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided] (describing “incompletely theorized
agreements” as goal of judicial minimalists who “generally try to avoid issues of basic
principle”).
I do not mean to suggest that courts never articulate norms. They do so in two ways.
First, in any constitutional challenge to a restriction on individual rights, courts will state
general norms regarding the government’s obligation to be reasonable and nonarbitrary.
Second, when norms regarding a social group are settled, courts will state those as well.
See infra notes 105–109 and accompanying text. My interest here, however, is in the
judicial process during periods of norm contestation and, in particular, in the way that
courts in these periods avoid articulating the group-related norms that are necessary to
their determinations of whether restrictions on group member rights are reasonable.
19. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 233
(1985) [hereinafter Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review] (“In our legal system, the
categories [of law and fact] have functioned as crucially important constructs that permit
us to understand, organize, and regulate certain forms of social experience.”). For useful
and fascinating accounts of the concept of fact, see generally Mary Poovey, A History of the
Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (1998);
Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550–1720 (2000).
Jürgen Habermas has explored a different dimension of the relationship between fact
and norm at length as it relates to the status and legitimacy of law. See generally Jürgen
Habermas, Between Fact and Norm: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
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soaked and socially constructed.20 The distinction between norms and
facts is similar to the much-explored difference between law and fact in
that the two “do[ ] not imply the existence of static, polar opposites.
Rather, [the two] have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and relative
stability on a continuum of experience.”21 Put another way, “because the
positions people take reflect and reinforce their cultural worldviews, disputes over [facts] are in essence ‘the product of an ongoing debate about
the ideal society.’”22 Consequently, by tracking and interrogating the way
that courts reify the boundary between facts and norms, we can begin to
demystify and critique the process by which courts absorb societal
change.
This Article focuses first on demonstrating the operation of factbased adjudication and then on theorizing and critiquing the judicial impulse for norm avoidance where the status of a social group is in flux.
Part I maps courts’ treatment of facts as decisive to adjudication and then
deconstructs this approach by showing that norms actually animate social
group-related decisionmaking, even if they are left unmentioned. Part II
documents the heightened inclination of courts to focus on facts about a
social group when norms related to group members are contested. This
section also demonstrates the trajectory that leads courts, in some cases,
to acknowledge norm shifts openly after the accretion of fact-based decisions reinforcing that norm. Part III explores a separate fiction perpetuated by the fact-based model: that courts can remain apart from the public debate in contested social group cases by affirming the status quo. As
the deconstruction of fact-based adjudication shows, courts cannot avoid
making nonneutral norm choices when evaluating restrictions on group
members’ rights.
Against this background, Part IV examines the relationship between
fact-based adjudication and extrajudicial influences on societal change.
Part V then considers explanations for fact-based adjudication from legal
process, legal realist, and socio-psychological schools of thought. This
section concludes that, regardless of which theory one embraces, factbased adjudication also must be understood as serving judicial institu20. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 98–99 (1995) (making this point
with respect to treatment of sex as fact and gender as norm); Suzanne B. Goldberg, On
Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 Or. L. Rev.
629, 650–53 (2002) (discussing occasional recognition by courts of socially constructed
nature of facts).
21. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, supra note 19, at 233.
22. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale L.
& Pol’y Rev. 149, 154 (2006) (citation omitted). Yet, as Kahan and Braman have also
observed, “instead of challenging one another’s worldviews, those who continue the debate
simply challenge one another’s honesty and integrity.” Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman,
More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1291, 1321 (2003). Within this Article’s frame, their point reinforces the argument
here that normative conflicts play out in empirical debates.
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tional interests because it minimizes constraints on future decisionmaking. By avoiding identification of underlying norms concerning group
members, courts issuing fact-based opinions retain freedom to engage
with future cases on factual grounds and reduce the likelihood that stare
decisis principles will require the norm reflected in earlier decisions to be
carried over into new cases.
Part VI assesses whether greater judicial candor regarding normative
judgments would be a better approach to adjudication in cases involving
the status of social groups. I conclude that while many benefits could
flow from pushing courts to address conflicting views about the status and
capacity of a given social group, categorical insistence on norm disclosure
would exact too high a price. In place of an absolute candor requirement, I explore a modified approach that would require courts to be candid about facts, even if norms remain unspoken, and test this approach
using the marriage cases discussed at the outset.
Ultimately, I argue that although courts go to great lengths to avoid
acknowledging their role in norm selection, every decision about restrictions on the rights of social group members requires a court to evaluate
whether negative judgments regarding group members are sufficient to
support the restriction. Consequently, judicial decisions that affirm the
status quo must be understood as strengthening the claim of the traditional norm, and not as prudent avoidance of the public debate. While
good reasons may exist to affirm tradition in some cases, the argument
that nonmajoritarian courts can stay out of the public debate and above
the normative fray by rejecting social groups’ equal protection and due
process claims misconceives the very nature of adjudication in the face of
social change.
I. THE PERVASIVE PRACTICE

OF

FACT-BASED ADJUDICATION

The fact-based adjudication model both describes the way that courts
focus on facts alone when evaluating restrictions on social groups and
provides a starting point for interrogating that practice. This section will
map the two primary ways courts hold out facts as the basis for their decisions and show that the premise of this adjudication method—that facts
alone can supply the judgment necessary to decide cases—is not analytically sound. Yet this analytic flaw does not inhibit courts from making
fact-based decisions, as Part II will show, particularly in cases where the
status of social group members is contested.
Fact-based decisions in social group cases can be divided roughly
into two broad categories: those relying on “thin” facts and others relying
on “thick” facts.23 “Thin” facts, in this schema, are nonevaluative, empiri23. Other typologies could be developed to capture courts’ treatment of facts that
would extend beyond the “thin”/”thick” categories drawn here. For example, additional
categories could distinguish among judicial reliance on facts that are a) mistaken; b) true
but irrelevant; and c) unclear. I thank Michael Klarman for this observation. For purposes
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cal, and largely uncontested.24 “Thick” facts, by contrast, have a pretense
of empiricism but actually contain normative judgments about the status
or capacity of social group members. Both types rely on the same fictional premise that facts alone can justify sustaining or invalidating a
given restriction.25 But separating the two gives us a sharper picture of
adjudication practices and enables us to see the different effects of societal change on judicial decisionmaking. In particular, as later discussion
will show, decisions resting on “thin” facts are more resistant than “thick”
fact decisions to pressures to incorporate changing views of social groups.
A. “Thick” Facts and the Merger of Norm into “Fact”
“Thick” facts are not “facts” in a conventional, empirical sense but
are, instead, normative judgments about group members’ capacities
presented in the guise of uncontestable data points.26 Put another way,
while they are stated as truths, which would suggest they are subject to
observation-based verification, “thick” facts actually contain both description (group X has a particular characteristic) and evaluation (the characteristic limits the status or capacity of group X).27 Yet courts regularly
ignore the contestable evaluation, treating the “thick” assertion as no different for purposes of credibility than “thin” empirical facts.
On their face, “thick” facts can, without more, justify restrictions on
social group members precisely because they contain not only empirical
information, but also negative judgments about group members. For example, if a court treats as “fact” the declarations that people with mental
retardation are “socially inadequate” and “manifestly unfit,” as the Court
did in Buck v. Bell,28 state-sponsored sterilization may seem a reasonable
response. Likewise, the “fact” that women are naturally domestic
arguably could justify restrictions on women in the workforce.29 Courts
similarly invoke the “fact” that gay people are less able parents than nongay people to sustain bans on adoption and marriage by lesbians and gay
men.30
of understanding the judicial response to changing views of social groups, however, the
“thin”/”thick” binary adequately captures the entanglement of facts and norms.
24. Dissents do not typically accord empirical facts the same centrality as majority
opinions. See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. For clarity, references to judicial
opinions throughout the Article encompass majority and unanimous opinions unless
otherwise indicated.
25. Heightened scrutiny will place greater demands on the fit between the
government action and the characteristic of the group, but the question whether a salient
difference exists between members and nonmembers is the same.
26. Indeed, we might think of them, oxymoronically, as normative facts.
27. See also infra text accompanying note 31.
28. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
29. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
30. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 (11th
Cir. 2004) (characterizing parenting by mother and father as “optimal social structure” for
childrearing), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
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This is not to suggest that courts are always conscious that their factual statements contain normative judgments.31 To the contrary, judges
often appear to be sincere in asserting judgments as fact, frequently characterizing them as “natural” attributes of the social group at issue or as
evidenced by common sense and intuition.32 For many courts (and the
surrounding society),33 the empirical fact of women’s greater likelihood
to be primary caregivers for children merely reflected the related “fact”
that women’s naturally ordained place was in the home.34 From this
“thick” fact, courts could then reasonably sustain all sorts of distinctions
between men and women.35
Early race discrimination cases contain some of the most striking
uses of “thick” facts to justify legal burdens on social groups, with norma1081 (2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359 (2006) (finding that state legislature
“could rationally believe that it is better . . . for children to grow up with both a mother and
a father”).
31. Indeed, the judgments embedded in “thick” facts typically do not become
apparent until perceptions of the status or capacity of social group members change. See
Charles W. Mills, The Racial Polity, in Racism and Philosophy 13, 18–19 (Susan E. Babbitt
& Sue Campbell eds., 1999) (“[I]f [normative claims] are not explicitly stated and
highlighted as integral to the political philosophy, it is often simply because they are part
of a conservative, background ‘common sense’ that its proponents take for granted.”).
When the reality of women’s lives could no longer be reconciled with the image of women
as helpless and ignorant, for example, the normative, gendered nature of the
presumptions underlying assertions of women’s natural domesticity became clear, and
courts could no longer rely on the earlier, “thick” fact without undermining their
legitimacy. Thus, because shifts in perceptions of groups can expose “thick” facts as
noncredible judgments, legal reasoning based on “thick” facts is relatively susceptible to
pressure to incorporate societal change. Others would argue, however, that courts
deliberately and strategically deploy norms as facts to avoid the conflict associated with
supporting controversial norms. See infra Part VI.
32. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (observing
that “the Court’s Justices are sometimes able to perceive significant facts . . . that eluded
their predecessors”).
33. As Michael Klarman has observed, judges typically share the normative views (and,
consequently, the perceptions of norms as fact) that are popular in the elite social circles
in which they live and work. See Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About
Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 145, 189–91 (1998).
34. This conversion of a demographic fact into a “natural” truth about a social group
was selective, of course. Demographic research also showed that many women—
particularly women who were not white or married to wealthy men—worked outside the
home. See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,
Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 371, 389–90 (2001) (arguing that “[j]udicially enforced stereotypes
of women as biologically and psychologically unsuited for participation in the paid labor
force limited their employment-related constitutional claims” despite the “welldocumented” fact that African American women had “always engaged in wage work in
large numbers”). Yet courts disregarded these other facts in making determinations about
women’s capacity.
35. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1948) (validating Michigan’s
sex-based restrictions for liquor licenses); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,
141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (stating that “destiny and mission” of woman is to
fulfill “offices of wife and mother”).
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tive judgments about African Americans cited as facts to prove the legal
relevance of racial differences. In 1867, for example, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court sustained the state’s antimiscegenation law on the
ground that “[t]he natural separation of the races is . . . an undeniable
fact.”36 Around the same time, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
state’s antimiscegenation statute based on “[o]ur daily observation . . .
that the offspring of these unnatural connections are generally sickly and
effeminate, and that they are inferior in physical development and
strength, to the full-blood of either race.”37 Sustaining a similar law in
1883, the Missouri Supreme Court pointed to the “well authenticated fact
that if the [issue] of a black man and a white woman, and a white man
and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any
progeny.”38
We see the work of “thick” facts, too, in the context of sex-based
distinctions, where Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion in Bradwell v.
Illinois 39 is perhaps the most familiar example of judicial reliance on a
norm as though it were fact. “The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex,” Justice Bradley reasoned, justified
the conclusion that women were “unfit[ ] . . . for many of the occupations
of civil life,” including the practice of law.40 Famously, too, the Supreme
Court in Muller v. Oregon treated as fact that women lacked, inter alia,
“the capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done standing,”
and “the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights.”41 Without
identifying, much less defending, the judgments contained in these purported data, the Court treated them as sufficient to support the challenged restrictions on women’s labor.42
36. W. Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213–14 (1867) (emphasis added)
(defending decision as “not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to
suffer men to follow the law of races . . . and not to compel them to intermix contrary to
their instincts”).
37. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869).
38. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130.
40. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). In doing so, he also commingled empirical
facts, like the law of coverture, along with other “facts” like “the law of the Creator,” to
reinforce his conclusion about women’s capacity. Id.
41. 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). This analytical move, as Justice O’Connor points out in
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 89–91 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), takes physical
differences between men and women and imputes them impermissibly with normative
significance to justify upholding differential sex-based rules. See infra notes 65–67 and
accompanying text.
42. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422–23. The power of this gender-based “thick” fact to
rationalize a restriction on women’s work hours may help explain how the Court could
have sustained that law while striking down on contractual freedom grounds other
protective laws in the same time period. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13–14
(1915) (invalidating a federal law that prohibited employers from requiring employees not
to join a union on grounds that the law violated freedom to contract protected by
Fourteenth Amendment), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (same), overruled in part by

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

1968

unknown

Seq: 14

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

20-NOV-06

13:58

[Vol. 106:1955

Buck v. Bell,43 mentioned above, illustrates the similar operation of
“thick” facts in connection with mental retardation. In upholding the
Virginia law authorizing sterilization of “mental defectives” on due process grounds, Justice Holmes, in his brief opinion, did not discuss the
empirical relationship between mental retardation and intellectual capacity.44 Instead, for him, the decisional keys were that people with mental
retardation were potential “menace[s],” “manifestly unfit,” and more
prone to crime and dependence on public support than others.45
In the context of sexual orientation, the “fact” that “children benefit
from the presence of both a father and mother in the home” more than
they would from two parents of the same sex has become popular with
courts as a justification for sexual orientation classifications in family
law.46 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, accepted Florida’s iteration of
this argument as a sufficient reason to sustain a state ban on adoption by
lesbians and gay men.47 The court concluded that the preference for
Phelps, 313 U.S. 177; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905) (declaring
unconstitutional a New York law that set maximum hours that bakers could work as
violating due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because law interfered with
freedom to contract and did not serve valid police purpose), overruled in part by Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and Day-Brite Lightning Inc. v. State of Mo., 342 U.S. 421
(1952); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591–93 (1897) (striking down state law that
prohibited payments on marine insurance policies issued by out-of-state companies not
licensed or approved to do business in the state on grounds that law interfered with
freedom to contract protected by due process clause). Of course, other related factors,
including a lesser tradition of contractual freedom for women than men, also might have
influenced the Court. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 Mich. L. Rev.
1960, 1969 (2003) (book review) (stating that at the time of Muller, “[t]he Supreme
Court . . . was not yet ready to treat women as fully equal citizens entitled to the same
degree of liberty of contract as men”).
43. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
44. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.9 (1985)
(discussing four categories of mental retardation based on IQ scores).
45. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206–07. In his opinion in Cleburne, Justice Marshall elaborated
on the widespread use of normative facts about people with mental retardation to justify
severe burdens. 473 U.S. at 462 (Marshall, J., concurring). As part of his historical
argument for heightened scrutiny of mental retardation-based classifications, he noted
that by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “leading medical authorities and
others began to portray the ‘feeble-minded’ as a ‘menace to society and civilization . . .
responsible in a large degree for many, if not all, of our social problems.’” Id. (citation
omitted). These views then became the “thick” facts that guided the analysis in Buck v. Bell.
Cf. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 283, 302 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (invalidating statute premised on assumption “that certain retarded children are
uneducable and untrainable”).
46. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819
(11th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 1081 (2005).
47. Id. This “fact” has been contested by many experts as well as by the Eleventh
Circuit’s dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1297
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (“The fact that Florida places children for adoption with single
parents directly and explicitly contradicts Florida’s post hoc assertion that the ban is
justified by the state’s wish to place children for adoption only with ‘families with married
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mother-father parental units was “one of those ‘unprovable assumptions’
that nevertheless can provide a legitimate basis for legislative action.”48
Similarly, New York’s high court relied recently on the “intuition and experience” that children were better off with a mother and father than
with two mothers or two fathers to justify excluding same-sex couples
from marriage.49 In terms of our framework, both courts treated these
assumptions and intuitions as statements of fact, in effect asserting that
the statements should be believed even if they are not susceptible to traditional, evidentiary documentation. The analytic difficulty arises because
the relevant evidence and briefing in the cases, as well as other parentingrelated legislation, contradicted these negative intuitions.50 By presenting contestable normative intuitions as fact, albeit not provable, these
mothers and fathers.’”); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual
Orientation of Parents Matter? 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 159, 161 (2001) (“[R]esearch, almost
uniformly, reports findings of no notable differences between children reared by
heterosexual parents, and those reared by lesbian and gay parents.”); see also Gregory M.
Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States: A Social
Science Perspective, 61 Am. Psychologist 607, 618 (2006) (pointing out “the lack of an
empirical basis for assertions that same-sex and heterosexual relationships differ
fundamentally in their psychosocial qualities and dynamics and that people in same-sex
relationships are deficient in parenting abilities”).
48. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819–20. The admission that its rationale depended on gut
instinct may have been discomforting to the court. Shortly after acknowledging the
absence of proof for its assumption that one mother and one father were better for
children than two mothers or two fathers, the court pointed to the failure of “the
accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience [to] discover[ ] a superior
model” to the household headed by a mother and a father. Id. at 820.
This is not the first time a court has relied on unprovable assumptions. Indeed, the
Supreme Court specifically endorsed these sorts of assumptions in connection with
obscenity, holding that “a state legislature may . . . act on the . . . assumption that
commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have [sic]
a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior.”
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). The cases on which the Court
relied for this proposition in Paris, however, concerned antitrust, securities, environmental
regulation, and obscenity. See id. at 61–63. None concerned assumptions regarding social
groups or the effect of aspects of individual identity.
49. Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359–60 (2006). This reasoning was similarly
employed by the Washington State Supreme Court a few weeks later. See Andersen v. King
County, No. 75934-1, 2006 Wash. LEXIS 598, at *54 (Wash. July 26, 2006) (“[N]o other
relationship has the potential to create, without third party involvement, a child
biologically related to both parents, and the legislature rationally could decide to limit
legal rights and obligations of marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
50. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Ass’n et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Respondents at 36, Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d 338 (No. 86), 2006 WL 1930166
(“Empirical research over the past two decades has failed to find any meaningful
difference in the parenting abilities of lesbian and gay parents compared to hetereosexual
parents.”); Amicus Curiae Brief of Children’s Rights Organizations in Support of
Respondents at 11, Andersen, 2006 Wash. LEXIS 598 (No. 75934-1) (reviewing array of
literature and concluding that “[c]hildren of gay and lesbian parents are found to be no
more likely than children of heterosexual parents to manifest problems with separation or
individuation; self-concept; moral judgment; and school adjustment”).
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courts avoided acknowledging, much less defending, the judgments implicit in their decisions.
B. “Thin” Facts and Unstated Norms
In contrast to “thick” facts, “thin” empirical facts do not themselves
contain social judgments that help determine whether and how the facts
might justify the restriction at issue. Yet courts regularly decide cases by
holding out “thin” empirical facts as decisive. In Heller, for example, the
Court cited facts about the timing and diagnosis of mental retardation to
justify a lower standard of proof for involuntary commitment of people
with mental retardation than people with mental illness.51 The Court
concluded that “Kentucky’s basic premise that mental retardation is easier to diagnose than is mental illness has a sufficient basis in fact.”52 Similarly, in Nguyen v. INS, the Court relied on the fact that women can give
birth to sustain an immigration law that made it easier for U.S. citizen
mothers than U.S. citizen fathers to gain citizenship for their foreignborn children.53 The Court reasoned that the empirical fact of mothers’
presence at childbirth54 rendered mothers more likely than fathers to
develop the “real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child
and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”55 Likewise, state
51. Heller v. Doe ex. rel Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321–23 (1993).
52. Id. at 322; see also id. at 323 (“Mental retardation is a permanent, relatively static
condition, so a determination of dangerousness may be made with some accuracy based on
previous behavior.” (citation omitted)); id. at 324 (“The prevailing methods of treatment
for the mentally retarded, as a general rule, are much less invasive than are those given the
mentally ill.”). More generally, the Court concluded that the “distinction between the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill” is a matter of “commonsense.” Id. at 326–27.
53. 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). For purposes of the analysis here, I am setting aside the
obvious point that childbirth itself provides evidence of parentage, placing women in a
different position from men. I do so because although the majority found that this
evidentiary justification supported the rule, it separately accepted the government’s
argument that mothers, by virtue of giving birth, are more likely than fathers to develop a
meaningful relationship with the child. Id. at 64–65.
54. State courts similarly have relied on physical differences between men and women
to sustain sex-based rules. The New York Court of Appeals observed, for example, that “no
one doubts that, as regards bodily strength and endurance, [woman] is inferior, and that
her health in the field of physical labor must be specially guarded by the state.” People v.
Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 640 (N.Y. 1915). In an earlier ruling, the Supreme
Court in the Washington Territory likewise pointed to “the physical constitution of
females” as the reason for sustaining an exclusion of women from grand jury duty.
Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 140 (1887).
55. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65. Some might argue that it was reasonable for Congress to
assume a special mother/child tie after childbirth because of women’s post-birth
hormonally driven commitment to their children, and that a normative commitment to
equality should not require courts to overlook “real” factual difference. Others would
maintain, however, that a methodology that would allow equation of a woman’s hormones
to a greater capacity for childrearing assumes rather than proves the point in question.
Thus, although some might treat the link between hormones and nurturing instinct as a
“thin” empirical fact, the link is contestable and, as a result, lacks the credibility-preserving
function that “thin” facts bring to judicial analysis. See infra Part V. Courts likewise do not
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courts have cited a biological fact of procreation—that only male-female
couples can have children without third-party assistance—to sustain the
exclusion of gay couples from marriage.56
Yet empirical facts, without more, cannot prove that a law is reasonable. Instead, behind-the-scenes social norms supply the connection between the fact about the social group and the legal burden on group
members.57 In Heller, for example, something more than differences in
information processing skills had to be at issue to sustain the different
institutionalization rules; after all, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, that same processing difference did not justify the zoning rule that
singled out for restriction a group home for people with mental retardatend to rely on data regarding “real” ethnic differences as espoused in The Bell Curve and
similar literature because the “facts” and the methodology that produced them are both
highly contested. See Thomas Sowell, Ethnicity and IQ, in The Bell Curve Wars: Race,
Intelligence, and the Future of America 70, 72 (Steven Fraser ed., 1995) (“Long before The
Bell Curve was published, the empirical literature showed repeatedly that IQ and other
mental tests do not predict a lower subsequent performance for minorities than the
performance that in fact emerges. . . . [T]he predictive validity of mental tests is the issue
least open to debate.”). Compare Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life 276 (1996) (claiming in chapter called
“Ethnic Differences in Cognitive Ability” that answer to question “Do Blacks Score
Differently from Whites on Standardized Tests of Cognitive Ability?” is “yes for every known
test of cognitive ability that meets basic psychometric standards of reliability and validity”),
with Jeffrey Rosen & Charles Lane, The Sources of The Bell Curve, in The Bell Curve Wars:
Race, Intelligence, and the Future of America, supra, at 58, 58–61 (“[E]ven a superficial
examination of the primary sources [used by the authors of The Bell Curve] suggests that
some of Murray and Herrnstein’s substantive arguments rely on questionable data and
hotly contested scholarship, produced by academics whose ideological biases are
pronounced.”). For a related debate arising from the statements of former Harvard
President Lawrence Summers regarding the relationship between sex and scientific
aptitude, compare Olivia Judson, Op-Ed., Different but (Probably) Equal, N.Y. Times, Jan.
23, 2005, § 4, at 17 (arguing that question whether average intrinsic cognitive difference
exists between men and women should be examined, particularly given vast biological
differences found in some species), with W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, Op-Ed., Scientists
Are Made, Not Born, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2005, at A19 (arguing that gains made by women
in historically male disciplines over past thirty years demonstrate that scientific ability is not
innate but rather developed through education). See also Elizabeth Spelke, Sex
Differences in Intrinsic Aptitude for Mathematics and Science? A Critical Review, 60 Am.
Psychologist 950, 956 (2005) (reviewing research on cognitive abilities of men and women
and concluding that data “does not support the claim that men have a greater intrinsic
aptitude for mathematics and science”).
56. See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 266–67 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(citing approvingly opinions of several courts that “rejected challenges to the
constitutionality of the limitation of marriage to members of the opposite sex [by relying]
upon the role that marriage plays in procreation and in providing the optimal
environment for child rearing”), rev’d, No. A-68-05, 2006 N.J. LEXIS 1521 (N.J. Oct. 25,
2006); see also infra notes 225–226 and accompanying text.
57. As will be elaborated below, there is a set of cases in which norms are declared to
be decisive. But this generally occurs when a norm is thought to be so well settled by virtue
of earlier opinions or positive law that concerns about judicial overreaching can be avoided
or moderated. See infra Part II.B.
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tion.58 Similarly in Nguyen, biological and demographic statistics showing
that mothers are more likely than fathers to raise their children could not
themselves prove that favoring mothers in immigration law was reasonable.59 Neither “inherent” nor demographic differences between men
and women alone can justify sex-based rules, as the Court had recognized
just a few years prior.60 If it were otherwise, then the same biological and
demographic facts could justify any distinction between men and women.
Likewise, the empirical fact of procreation itself cannot explain the legal
distinction between gay and nongay people in marriage law. If it did, we
would expect to see legal distinctions based on sexual orientation in all
realms; yet these distinctions are relatively rare.
In short, none of these facts, which we conventionally think of as
science-based or empirical, automatically generates a conclusion about
the reasonableness of restrictions based on intellectual capacity, sex, or
sexual orientation. Instead, normative judgments give significance to the
empirical facts. That is, they supply us with the information necessary to
determine the relationship between the fact and the legal restriction at
issue. For example, social norms, not biology, tell us whether and how
childbearing should affect women’s workforce participation or relationships with children. Yet courts treat biological facts as though they do
exactly that, eliding the point that empirical facts and the social meaning
ascribed to those facts61 are actually separate strands of information.62
The problem with this elision is that it shields courts from having to
expose and defend the norms that shape their decisions. Ordinarily, of
course, judicial notice requires transparency in judicial assumptions
58. See Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1993); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450–51 (1985).
59. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89–91 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
60. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“‘Inherent differences’
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but
not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual’s opportunity.”); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980)
(holding that wives’ greater financial dependence on their husbands could not justify sexbased workers’ compensation rule regarding death benefit eligibility); see also infra text
accompanying notes 102–104.
61. For accounts of the process by which society attaches meaning and norms to
empirical facts, see, e.g., Poovey, supra note 19, at 236–49 (arguing that an interpretive
framework often “help[s] produce the entity it claim[s] to describe” in empirical terms).
62. Norms themselves also should be understood as comprised of multiple judgments,
even when they appear to express a broad, unilateral view of a characteristic or form of
conduct. When the norm is well settled, the individual strands of judgment remain
unseen. But if the general norm is contested and becomes destabilized, the strands
become relevant as some specific norms fall away while others retain their force. A general
norm disapproving homosexuality, for instance, may be comprised of several specific
strands—some disapproving adult caregiving relationships with children, others related to
valuing partnerships of different-sex couples over partnerships of same-sex couples, and
still others related to disapproval of gay people as tenants or employees. As the broad
norm becomes destabilized, some strands will carry greater force than others, as will be
discussed in greater detail below. See infra Part V.A.
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about facts. Fact-based adjudication operates to undermine that
obligation.
In part because principles of judicial notice do not have their usual
effect, dissents take up the task of challenging the majority’s unspoken
normative judgments and thereby highlighting the flawed premise that
facts alone can guide decisionmaking. In Heller, for example, Justice
Souter’s dissent (for four members of the Court) conceded that
“[o]bviously there are differences between mental retardation and
mental illness,”63 but concluded that the factual differences could not
support Kentucky’s separate rules. Instead, Justice Souter argued that an
impermissible norm, unacknowledged by the majority, enabled these factual differences to be given undeserved significance. It is “difficult,” he
wrote, “to see [the distinction giving family members greater control over
institutionalization of people with mental retardation than people with
mental illness] as resting on anything other than the stereotypical assumption that the retarded are ‘perpetual children.’”64
The dissenters in Nguyen similarly stressed that the fact that women
give birth to children could not itself explain the sex-based citizenship
rule that imposed a lesser burden on mothers than fathers.65 “The ‘physical differences between men and women’ . . . do not justify [the statute’s] discrimination,” Justice O’Connor wrote, observing that “the idea
that a mother’s presence at birth supplies adequate assurance of an opportunity to develop a relationship while a father’s presence at birth does
not would appear to rest only on an overbroad sex-based generalization.”66 The majority could connect the two and sustain the challenged
law only by overlaying the uncontested empirical fact of childbirth with
63. Heller, 509 U.S. at 337 (Souter, J., dissenting). In addition to highlighting the
norms that he believed to be at work, Justice Souter disagreed with the majority’s account
of empirical differences between mental retardation and mental illness. Id. at 342–46
(arguing, based on social science literature, that treatment of people with mental
retardation often involves invasive procedures, contrary to majority’s contention); see also
id. at 342 (“[A]ny apparent plausibility in the Court’s suggestion that the mentally retarded
in general are not subjected to [invasive mind-altering treatment] dissipates the moment
we examine readily available material on the subject, including studies . . . cited by the
Court.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. Id. at 348.
65. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 88–89 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 86–87 (citation and punctuation omitted). Justice O’Connor observed as
well that:
A mother may not have an opportunity for a relationship if the child is removed
from his or her mother on account of alleged abuse or neglect, or if the child and
mother are separated by tragedy, such as disaster or war, of the sort apparently
present in this case. There is no reason, other than stereotype, to say that fathers
who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar terms.
Id. To strengthen the case that an impermissible traditional norm had been applied,
Justice O’Connor also situated the law historically, declaring it “paradigmatic of a historic
regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility, for
nonmarital children.” Id. at 92 (citing various debates over legislation at issue as well as
numerous state laws to support this view).
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the normative view that women have a stronger instinct to parent than
men:
The claim that [the statute] substantially relates to the achievement of the goal of a “real, practical relationship” . . . finds support not in biological differences but instead in a stereotype—
i.e., “the generalization that mothers are significantly more
likely than fathers . . . to develop caring relationships with their
children.” Such a claim relies on “the very stereotype the law
condemns,” “lends credibility” to the generalization, and helps
convert that “assumption” into “a self-fulfilling prophecy.”67
And this normative view, Justice O’Connor contended, was
impermissible.
Likewise, in Romer v. Evans, the majority focused on facts to invalidate Colorado’s ban on antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals, characterizing the measure as “a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context.”68 In response, the dissent chastised the majority for refusing to address a norm underlying the relevant
fact—“moral disapproval of homosexual conduct”—that, in its view, supplied a link between the measure’s separate political rules for gay and
nongay people and the state’s alleged interests in preserving associational
freedom and scarce resources.69
In sum, although courts hold out facts as decisive in both “thin” and
“thick” fact cases, those facts actually contribute little to their decisions’
reasoning. Instead, the norms embedded in the “thick” facts or associated with the “thin” facts do the explanatory work in adjudication. As will
be shown below, only when “new” perceptions of group members reveal
and reject the work of those norms are courts likely to experience meaningful pressure to incorporate those changed views.
II. FACT-BASED INTERVENTIONS

IN

CONTESTED NORMATIVE TERRAIN

The model of fact-based adjudication just discussed is particularly
useful for its window onto the process by which courts “tip” from one view
of a group’s constitutional rights or status to another as a result of societal
change. This section will describe the role of facts in the tipping process,
leaving for later sections a critical examination of courts’ use of facts in
this way.
The dissenters also rejected the majority’s fact-based conclusion that more evidence of
parenthood is needed from fathers than mothers because the evidence of pregnancy and
childbirth is missing. See id. at 81–82 (“[T]he majority has not shown that a mother’s
birth relation is uniquely verifiable by the INS, much less that any greater verifiability
warrants a sex-based, rather than a sex-neutral, statute.” (citation omitted)).
67. Id. at 88–89 (citations omitted).
68. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
69. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 630–31 (majority opinion) (identifying
state’s purported justifications for the constitutional amendment); see also infra note 100.
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Typically, the move from one view of a social group’s constitutional
rights to another occurs in stages. At the outset, when groups are first
contesting restrictions on their rights, traditional rationales have a strong
hold, and norm contests at the margins tend to have little effect on either
adjudication or outcomes. Tradition thus tends to remain firmly in
place.
Once those contests reach the mainstream,70 however, changing societal perceptions of group members begin to exert a quiet influence on
decisionmaking. Rather than offering an all-out embrace (or rejection)
of the new trend in thought about the group in question, courts tend to
respond to litigation of group members’ rights in a circumscribed, factfocused manner. Courts that tip toward change often will hold that
“new” facts or new understandings of facts require rejection of traditional
rationales for restricting group members’ rights. Although these decisions effectively embrace a new normative judgment about the group’s
status or capacity, the fact-based adjudication model enables them to
avoid acknowledging the norm shift.
Over time, in some cases, these fact-based decisions accrete and begin to reflect a coherent new view of a social group. By stabilizing the
new norm, this accretion in turn frees courts to bypass the security of factbased adjudication in favor of norm declarations that they had avoided in
less stable jurisprudential and social environments.
A. A Prelude to Tipping
Not all challenges to traditional norms provoke norm shifts.71 Most
of the time, norms are so deeply integrated into society that they are unseen and, if seen, are understood to reflect indisputable judgments about
certain aspects of social group members’ identity and conduct.72 In this
naturalized state, norms might be said to be at room temperature, enabling courts to be genuinely unaware of their reliance on them, as the
Nguyen majority ostensibly was when it tacitly accepted the norm that the
70. Of course, not all challenges to traditional norms reach the mainstream or follow
with precision the stages of the “tipping” process elaborated here. See infra notes 71–79
and accompanying text.
71. The framework is not intended to suggest that the emergence of new norms is
always preferable from the standpoint of either the social group at issue or others in the
surrounding society.
72. Much critical legal scholarship has concentrated on exposing the way norms
blend into what is perceived as natural. A significant body of feminist scholarship, for
example, has concentrated on exposing the male bias in many naturalized norms. See,
e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1985) (explaining way in which “the subordination in gender inequality[ ]
is made invisible; dissent from it becomes inaudible as well as rare”). Separately, a growing
body of law and economics literature has focused on harnessing the power of naturalized
norms toward efficient or socially beneficial ends. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social
Norms (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903
(1996).
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act of giving birth itself creates a bond between mothers and their children that cannot be presumed for fathers.73
When norms are so deeply integrated into society, whatever contestation has occurred can be deemed too peripheral to have gained traction,
and courts can proceed as though nothing has occurred to destabilize the
traditionally accepted facts and norms.
We might think of Myra Bradwell’s challenge to Illinois’s attorney
licensing rule74 or Carrie Buck’s challenge to Virginia’s sterilization
rule75 in this way. Both cases advanced equality claims at a time when
commitments to sex equality and equal treatment of people with mental
retardation were all but unthinkable in the broader society.
Consider, too, the first wave of challenges to marriage laws brought
by lesbian and gay couples in the 1970s and 1980s.76 At that time, movements for gay liberation and gay rights had made substantial headway in
disrupting the view of gay people as mentally ill77 and some progress toward dispelling the belief that gay people were inherently inferior to
heterosexuals, as evidenced by the passage of antidiscrimination ordinances prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.78 Yet not even a
tremor of these norm changes received recognition from any court asked
to decide whether state marriage laws discriminated unlawfully against
same-sex couples. Instead, these marriage challenges were the proverbial
easy cases, with arguments quickly dismissed.79
B. Intervention via “New” Facts
When norm contests spill into the mainstream and courts first take
up the invitation to reject traditional norms, the approach shifts markedly. In these cases, in the place of carefree invocation of “thin” or
73. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 66 (2001) (accepting link between “thin” facts about
social group (i.e., men cannot give birth) and laws limiting social group members’ rights
(i.e., fathers must take more steps than mothers to have citizenship conferred on their
children even if they are present at birth)).
74. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
75. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
76. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (rejecting challenge
to marriage law’s exclusion of gay couples); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn.
1971) (same), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952,
952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) (same).
77. See infra note 144 (describing removal of homosexuality from American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1973).
78. See Lisa Keen & Suzanne B. Goldberg, Strangers to the Law: Gay People on Trial
5–6 (1998) (describing political context surrounding passage of early sexual orientation
antidiscrimination ordinances).
79. As Mahatma Gandhi observed with respect to social change efforts, “First they
ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, and then you win.” The Quotable
Rebel 92 (Teishan Latner ed., 2005). At this early contestation stage, courts could be
described as ignoring plaintiffs’ claims.
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“thick” facts to sustain the status quo, courts make statements about
“new” facts that require change.80
Brown v. Board of Education 81 is perhaps the best-known example of
this judicial inclination to use “new” facts to justify new conclusions about
previously settled matters while avoiding mention of an underlying norm
shift. In reversing Plessy v. Ferguson’s82 separate but equal doctrine as applied to public education, the Court identified “modern” knowledge as its
analytic linchpin: “Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that racially segregated schooling causes harm] is amply supported by modern authority.”83 The Court also pointed to other changed facts to support its analysis; it noted, for example, the changed “status of public education”84 and
the heightened achievements of African Americans in professional and
cultural circles.85 Nowhere in the decision did norms regarding African
Americans or racial equality receive mention.86 Several decades later, the
80. Precisely when challenges to settled norms move from margin to center is, of
course, difficult to identify with precision, as the determination depends on which
evidence of contestation, empirical or otherwise, is valued. See infra text accompanying
notes 163–175 (discussing conflicting perspectives of majority and dissenting opinions on
status of norms regarding juvenile death penalty). Further, to be clear, even after a tipping
point has been reached, contestation does not disappear entirely. Instead, the reference
to a tipping point suggests that a once-natural norm has begun to lose its dominance
among the general public.
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
83. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
84. Id. at 489; see also id. at 492–93 (“We must consider public education in the light
of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”).
85. Id. at 490 (“Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success
in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world.”).
86. In offering a rationale for Brown different from the one advanced by the Court,
Charles Black acknowledged the Court’s reliance on facts rather than norm declarations in
its opinion:
It seems to me that the venial fault of the opinion consists in its not spelling out
that segregation . . . is perceptibly a means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior
race. (I would conjecture that the motive for this omission was reluctance to go
into the distasteful details of the southern caste system.) That such treatment is
generally not good for children needs less talk than the Court gives it.
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421, 430
n.25 (1960).
The surrounding global political context, in which the persistence of racial
segregation was perceived as undermining the United States’s position in the Cold War,
also went unmentioned in Brown. See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Josephine Baker, Racial
Protest, and the Cold War, 81 J. Am. Hist. 543, 544 (1994) (“[T]he United States claimed
that democracy was superior to communism . . . particularly in its protection of individual
rights and liberties [but] the nation practiced pervasive race discrimination. . . . The Soviet
Union and the Communist press in various nations used the race issue very effectively in
anti-American propaganda.”).
For an illustration of state court inclinations to avoid normative declarations that
might be subject to contestation, see, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y.
1989). The court in Braschi cited facts about how two gay men lived together as
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Court reinforced the notion that changed conceptions of facts, rather
than changes to social norms, accounted for Plessy’s reversal: “[T]he
Plessy Court’s explanation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the
facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision [in Brown] to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified but required.”87
The California Supreme Court similarly treated “new” facts regarding race as decisive in striking down the state’s antimiscegenation law at a
time when such laws were widely viewed as permissible.88 The factual
grounds for racial discrimination in marriage had long been viewed as
well settled: “[T]he prohibition of intermarriage . . . prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races whose members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians.”89 To explain its shift
away from these traditionally accepted “facts,” the court turned to science: “The categorical statement that non-Caucasians are inherently
physically inferior is without scientific proof. In recent years scientists
have attached great weight to the fact that their segregation in a generally
inferior environment greatly increases their liability to physical ailments.”90 The court also pointed to the absence of “scientific proof that

“permanent life partners” to support including them within the statutory term “family” for
purposes of succession to a rent-controlled apartment. Id. Yet it did not acknowledge the
norm shift embodied in that determination.
87. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992). The Court in
Casey also recognized that its pattern of fact-based decisionmaking carried over to contexts
unrelated to shifting judgments about social groups. Discussing the Lochner era and its
demise, the Court observed that:
West Coast Hotel [Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)] . . . rested on facts, or an
understanding of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed
justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions. Each case was
comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the country could
understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an
earlier day . . . had not been able to perceive. As the decisions were thus
comprehensible they were also defensible . . . as applications of constitutional
principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before.
Id. at 863–64.
88. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 23–24 (Cal. 1948) (en banc) (dismissing myth
of racial superiority because of lack of scientific proof); see also Keith E. Sealing, Blood
Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 Mich. J.
Race & L. 559, 601 (2000) (describing Perez court’s ruling as “the first true crack in the
courts’ monolithic support for the constitutionality of miscegenation statutes”). For
examples of state decisions upholding antimiscegenation statutes, see, e.g., Jackson v.
State, 72 So. 2d 114, 115 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954) (sustaining Alabama’s antimiscegenation
statute); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (sustaining Virginia’s similar law).
89. Perez, 198 P.2d at 23 (paraphrasing the state’s justification for antimiscegenation
statute); see also id. at 26 (“Out of earnest belief, or out of irrational fears, [defenders of
the antimiscegenation law] reason in a circle that such minorities are inferior in health,
intelligence, and culture, and that this inferiority proves the need of the barriers of race
prejudice.”).
90. Id. at 23–24.
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one race is superior to another in native ability.”91 Once the facts were
framed in this way, the rejection of the racial classification necessarily
followed.92
Early decisions in the contemporary women’s rights cases also illustrate this pattern of norm avoidance during periods of social contestation. Beginning with Reed v. Reed,93 numerous fact-based decisions reflected a commitment to women’s equality without ever acknowledging
the shift from earlier, contrary norms that women were less capable than
men in many arenas. In Reed, the Court highlighted a fact (women have
at least as much experience as men with administering estates) to help
explain its determination that Idaho’s subordination of wives to husbands
in prioritizing estate administrators was arbitrary.94 The Court never
mentioned, much less refuted, the traditional sex-based norm relied on
by the Idaho Supreme Court to sustain the law: “[N]ature itself has established the distinction” between men and women.95 By sidestepping the
traditionally accepted judgment about men and women and offering up
facts instead, the U.S. Supreme Court left the norm confrontation for
another day.96
Romer v. Evans 97 illustrates this same point with respect to sexual orientation classifications. Until Romer, Bowers v. Hardwick’s declaration that
homosexuality was rightfully the subject of moral and legislative disapproval represented the prevailing constitutional discourse regarding homosexuality.98 Thus, for Romer to recognize the claim that a state constitutional ban on antidiscrimination protections for gay people violated the
91. Id. at 24–25 (footnote omitted) (“The data on which Caucasian superiorty [sic] is
based have undergone considerable re-evaluation by social and physical scientists in the
past two decades.”).
92. To support this analytic move, the court also highlighted Gunnar Myrdal’s work
linking the earlier normative facts about race to bias in observation. See id. at 25 n.6. The
court held out Myrdal’s observations, together with the scientific data just mentioned, as
requiring its conclusion that previous beliefs about African Americans amounted to norms
rather than facts. See id. (“‘[T]he ordinary white American . . . has made an error in
inferring that observed differences were innate and a part of “nature.”’” (quoting 1
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy
147–48 (1944))).
93. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
94. Id. at 76–77.
95. Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho 1970), rev’d, 404 U.S. 71.
96. In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S 632 (1974), and Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), among others, the Court similarly invalidated
pregnancy-based and sex-based rules, not by declaring normative opposition to those sorts
of legal distinctions, but instead by finding that the facts related to pregnancy and child
care did not support the legal restriction imposed. This is true as well for cases affirming
sex-based distinctions post-Reed, such as Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), in which norm declarations were largely absent
from the majority opinions and the focus was, instead, on the factual support for the
challenged rules.
97. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
98. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

1980

unknown

Seq: 26

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

20-NOV-06

13:58

[Vol. 106:1955

rights of these individuals, it had to reject, or at least deviate from, the
traditionally embraced views of gay people reflected in Bowers. Yet the
majority opinion did not acknowledge this move. As noted earlier, it instead anchored its invalidation of Colorado’s amendment on the ban’s
factual disconnect with the state’s asserted interests.99 Although Justice
Scalia’s dissent reasserted that the traditional social norm disapproving of
homosexuality sufficed to justify the challenged measure,100 the Romer
Court avoided any overt engagement with that moral judgment.101 In
short, as these cases illustrate, when breaking with tradition, the Court
has led with facts and left norms aside.
C. Fact-Based Decisions as the Groundwork for Norm Declarations
As indicated above, fact-based adjudication is often the first step in a
two-step decisionmaking dynamic through which courts tip from one view
of a group’s constitutional rights to another. The second step occurs after one or more cases have settled the “new” understanding of facts without reference to norms. After this accretion process, the potential controversy associated with judicial intervention in contested normative
terrain diminishes. Consequently, courts become willing to declare the
new norms explicitly.
The trajectory of women’s rights cases nicely illustrates the accretion
dynamic. It was not until after Reed and several additional fact-intensive
opinions sustaining claims for sex equality that a majority of the Court
openly embraced the normative value of sex equality. When the Court
ultimately made that commitment explicit, it treated its move not as declaring a “new” norm but as articulating a norm whose settlement was
evidenced by earlier (fact-based) decisions. For example, in Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., the Court found that women’s disproportionate financial dependence on their husbands could not support a
workers’ compensation provision requiring widowers but not widows to
prove dependence before recovering death benefits.102 Although that
fact undoubtedly would have been taken to justify the rule in the past—
99. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; see also text accompanying supra note 69.
100. “It is unsurprising that the Court avoids discussion” of the moral disapproval
rationale, Justice Scalia wrote, “since the answer [to the question of the rationale’s
applicability here] is so obviously yes.” Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 653
(describing as legitimate people’s desire “to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual
morality favored by a majority of Coloradans”).
101. Romer could be characterized as a “norm” case to the extent it is read to
announce (or affirm) a general norm that hostility toward a group of people cannot justify
restrictions on the rights of group members. To the extent that Romer is understood as
signaling a change in the constitutional status of gay people, however, the Court left that
normative shift unacknowledged.
102. 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (“It may be that there is empirical support for the
proposition that men are more likely to be the principal supporters of their spouses and
families.”).
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and indeed, was treated as decisive by the lower court103—the Court declared the devaluation of women’s work relative to their husbands’ to
conflict with a now-settled norm of sex equality: “It is this kind of discrimination against working women that our cases have identified and in the
circumstances found unjustified.”104
The accretion phenomenon also explains the timing of Supreme
Court announcements that particular classifications will be subjected to
heightened scrutiny. These formal and explicit commitments to prevent
the unwitting enforcement of traditional norms about a social group occur only after the accretion of fact-based decisions regarding the social
group in question.105 With these decisions in place, the Court appears to
become confident that the social group’s equality to its counterpart
group will no longer be seriously contested. Heightened scrutiny, in
other words, signals the settlement of a “new” general norm (at least from
the Court’s perspective) that promotes skepticism toward negative judgments about social group members that would have been accepted previously to justify different treatment.106 This trajectory—fact-based cases
103. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Mo. 1979) (“[T]he
substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women justifies the
advantage that [the law] administratively gives to a widow.”). For a discussion of earlier
norms and their influence on workers’ compensation and wrongful death statutes, see
generally John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute
Widows, and the Remaking of American Law (2004).
104. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 147; see also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975)
(invalidating sex-based child support rule based on judicial notice of “[t]he presence of
women in business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life” and
related conclusion that “[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas”);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975) (holding that facts related to women’s
workforce participation “certainly put to rest the suggestion that all women should be
exempt from jury service based solely on their sex and the presumed role in the home”).
105. Heightened scrutiny, after all, represents a deviation from the Court’s ordinary
orientation toward norm avoidance, as it reflects an explicit commitment to skepticism
toward distinctions based on facts about the protected social group. See Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This [rational basis] standard permits a
court to hypothesize interests that might support legislative distinctions, whereas
heightened scrutiny limits the realm of justification to demonstrable reality.”); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (describing heightened scrutiny as “skeptical
. . . of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex”); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272–73 (1979) (identifying suspect classifications as themselves containing “a
reason to infer antipathy”).
106. This point is somewhat more complicated with respect to racial classifications
than with respect to the sex classifications discussed below. For one, courts acknowledged
some version of racial equality almost immediately after the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 303–08 (1879) (overturning
criminal conviction by jury from which African Americans had been excluded on grounds
that exclusion was “a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing
to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others”). At
the same time, however, this recognition did not translate into broad skepticism of racial
classifications. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (“A statute which
implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races . . . has no tendency
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first and norm declarations thereafter—also helps explain why the Court
appeared to be applying heightened scrutiny in cases involving both sex
and illegitimacy classifications before it acknowledged that it was doing
so.107
Once the Court has declared heightened scrutiny, an equality norm
begins to reshape consideration of facts about the social group in adjudication. In United States v. Virginia, for example, the Court dismissed the
relevance of perceived factual differences between men and women, relying on a sex equality norm to invalidate the Virginia Military Institute’s
sex-based admission policy.108 Likewise, in J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court
recognized that differences might exist between male and female jurors
but, through an equality-focused analysis, found that the differences
could not justify a sex-based peremptory strike.109 This is not to suggest
that the sex equality norm always carries the day, as Nguyen and other
cases show.110 But, as in Wengler and Virginia, among others, the applicato destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary
servitude.”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Further, even after
the Court first characterized race as a “suspect” ground for classification in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), it did not begin actual rigorous review of racial
classifications for another twenty years. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964) (stressing Fourteenth Amendment’s “strong policy” against racial classifications);
see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 496–503
(2004) [hereinafter Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers] (analyzing evolution of suspect
classification analysis); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 226–40 (1991) (same).
107. Many scholars have maintained that the Court had been applying heightened
scrutiny to sex classifications since Reed. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 16-26 (2d ed. 1988); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 33–34 (1972). The Court likewise appeared to
be applying intermediate scrutiny to classifications of nonmarital children long before its
formal pronouncement of quasi-suspect classification status for those classifications in
1988. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Gunther, supra, at 33–36.
108. 518 U.S. at 533–34 (finding that “inherent differences between men and
women” did not justify constraints on women’s opportunities and that sex-based
classifications “may not be used, as they once were . . . to create or perpetuate the legal,
social, and economic inferiority of women” (citations and punctuation omitted)).
109. 511 U.S. 127, 138–42 (1994).
110. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68 (holding “that facilitation of a relationship between
parent and child is an important governmental interest” and that “at the moment of birth
. . . the mother’s knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established
in a way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father”); see also Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470–82 (1981) (holding that state was justified in punishing only men
for statutory rape law because “[o]nly women may become pregnant, and they suffer
disproportionately the profound physical, emotional and psychological consequences of
sexual activity” and “[t]he statute at issue here protects women from sexual intercourse at
an age when those consequences are particularly severe”). One might argue that the
accretion phenomenon should have led Nguyen to come out differently, given that it was
decided relatively late in the evolution of women’s rights cases. As noted earlier, however,
when general norms regarding social groups come under challenge, some individual
judgments regarding group members will retain greater force than others. See supra note
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tion of heightened scrutiny illustrates the Court’s willingness to engage in
overt norm-based adjudication in a way that does not happen when the
Court perceives the norms to be unsettled.
The accretion phenomenon is not limited to classifications that are
ultimately subjected to heightened scrutiny. Among sexual orientation
cases, for example, we can explain the development from Bowers v.
Hardwick 111 to Romer v. Evans 112 and Lawrence v. Texas 113 through this
lens.114 In all three cases, the baseline question was whether anything
about homosexuality justified the state’s limitation of gay people’s rights.
In Bowers, the Court treated social norms condemning homosexuality as
sufficiently settled so that they could be stated, without more, as the justification for Georgia’s sodomy law.115 Then in Romer, the Court focused
on the lack of factual support for Colorado’s antigay ban and struck down
the measure without mentioning the Bowers-approved norm regarding
gay people.116 Romer thus served as the fact-based, norm-avoidant precursor for Lawrence’s outright rejection of the moral disapproval norm.117
Of course, a host of other explanations could account for the different adjudicative approaches of Romer and Lawrence, including the differ62. Nguyen’s holding can be understood as reflecting either the Court’s heightened
deference to Congress because of the citizenship benefit at issue or the Court’s intention
to cut back on the expansive characterization of equal protection in Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.
But, in my view, the decision also reflects the distinctive sticking power of norms regarding
procreation and childbirth relative to other sex-related norms. I plan to develop this
argument at length in a future work.
111. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
112. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
113. 539 U.S. 558.
114. Arguments to subject sexual orientation classifications to heightened scrutiny
continue to be made by advocates. See, e.g., Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund,
et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039), 1995
WL 17008436 (showing why classifications that burden lesbians and gay men should be
treated as suspect based on Court’s traditional criteria for heightened review). The
Supreme Court has not yet explicitly addressed the application of heightened scrutiny in
this context. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–36 (invalidating classification based on
sexual orientation under rational basis review without addressing heightened scrutiny
claims).
115. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (acknowledging “the presumed belief of a majority of the
electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”). The nearuniversal condemnation of Bowers suggested that the Court had miscalculated (or
deliberately misrepresented) the degree to which social norms regarding homosexuality
were contested when it glibly asserted the moral disapproval rationale and brushed off
Michael Hardwick’s privacy claim as “at best, facetious.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–78
(citing criticism of Bowers).
116. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
117. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Moral disapproval of this
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.”); cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 Minn. L.
Rev. 1233, 1281–83 (2004) (analyzing Lawrence majority’s limited engagement with the
state’s moral disapproval rationale).

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

1984

unknown

Seq: 30

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

20-NOV-06

13:58

[Vol. 106:1955

ent doctrinal foundations of the two decisions, with Romer focused on
equal protection and Lawrence on due process.118 In addition, moral disapproval was the lead justification for the law proffered by the state in
Lawrence, while the state had advanced several other rationales more
prominently in Romer.119 And, certainly, the outlier status of the Texas
Homosexual Conduct Law as only one of a handful of such laws in the
nation120 made the norm declaration relatively safe in Lawrence. But
none of these factors fully explains why the Romer majority did not touch
the moral norm advanced so forcefully by the dissent and why Lawrence
ultimately did. The judicial inclination toward norm avoidance when the
normative waters appear to be unsettled provides at least some of that
explanation.
III. THE RHETORIC

FACT-BASED ADJUDICATION AND
APPEARANCE OF NEUTRALITY

OF

THE

MISLEADING

Courts’ deep-seated disinclination to be seen as norm selectors carries over to the self-conscious way in which courts characterize their decisions. Whether or not they affirm the status quo, courts deciding cases in
which social norms are contested often go to great lengths to frame their
decisions as following, rather than intervening in, the public debate. Yet
this pretense of neutrality rests on the same fictional premise that underlies fact-based adjudication—that courts can avoid choosing among
norms in social group cases.
The marriage cases discussed in the Introduction nicely illustrate the
point.121 Centrally at issue is whether the rationales traditionally accepted for excluding same-sex couples from marriage have been undermined by changed norms regarding gay people. Yet, almost universally,
courts deciding these cases will not acknowledge that they are passing
judgment on these norms; rather, they maintain that they are merely following society’s will.122
118. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–35 (invalidating Colorado amendment on equal
protection grounds), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (stating that “the case should be
resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the
private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution”).
119. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–73 (analyzing morals-based government interest);
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 (addressing government interests related to associational
freedom and scarce resources).
120. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (stating that only four states at that time enforced
sodomy laws targeted specifically at sexual conduct of same-sex couples).
121. See supra note 5.
122. Courts in these cases also deploy references to norm contestation when analyzing
fundamental rights claims by same-sex couples. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77
P.3d 451, 459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“Although same-sex relationships are more open and
have garnered greater societal acceptance in recent years, same-sex marriages are neither
deeply rooted in the legal and social history of our Nation or state nor are they implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”). Because analysis of fundamental rights claims tends to
be backward looking, see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A
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At one end of the spectrum, courts suggest that by affirming the status quo, they are staying out of the debate. A New Jersey trial court, for
example, recognized that “[g]reat strides have already been made in protecting same-sex partners in New Jersey,” but concluded that “difficult
social issues” and the need for “vital debate and delicate political negotiations” required it to sustain “the traditional understanding of marriage.”123 The Arizona Court of Appeals likewise concluded that “although many traditional views of homosexuality have been recast over
time,” the court should leave it to “the people of Arizona, through their
elected representatives . . . to decide whether to permit same-sex
marriages.”124
At the other end of the spectrum, courts that reject traditional rationales for discrimination in marriage suggest that they, too, are not making independent norm selections, but rather are enforcing the people’s
already-established will. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
for example, concluded that changed state policies and jurisprudence
Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1161 passim (1988), only minimal focus is placed on the contemporary validity of the
traditional norm that is my focus here.
Notably, whether courts affirm or reject the status quo, they typically take care in these
cases to express respect for the sincerity of the views held by those whose position they
reject, perhaps as a legitimacy-preserving device consistent with their invocation of the
countermajoritarian difficulty. See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 146 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2004) (“This Court’s personal view [is] that children raised by same-sex couples
enjoy benefits possibly different, but equal, to those raised by opposite-sex couples . . . .”);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (“Many people hold
deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to
the union of one man and one woman . . . .”); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL
23191114, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (“[T]he court is sympathetic to
the interests of the plaintiffs . . . .”), aff’d, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005),
rev’d, No. A-68-05, 2006 N.J. LEXIS 1521 (N.J. Oct. 25, 2006); Andersen v. King County,
No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004) (“[Samesex marriage] is [an issue] about which people of the highest intellect, the deepest
morality and the broadest public vision maintain divergent opinions, strongly held in good
faith and all worthy of great respect.”), rev’d, No. 75934-1, 2006 Wash. LEXIS 598 (Wash.
July 26, 2006).
123. Lewis, 2003 WL 23191114, at *23–*26. Noting that “[s]ocial change of the type
sought by plaintiffs is properly accomplished in the legislative arena,” id. at *23, the court
went so far as to catalogue an extensive series of judicial decisions and statutes providing
extensive legal protection for and recognition of same-sex couples. See id. at *25–*26; see
also Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 866 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (“The decision to extend
any or all of the benefits associated with marriage is a task for the Legislature . . . . Social
perceptions of same-sex civil contracts may change over time, and every group has the
right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of such matters is the best.”), aff’d, 811
N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006);
Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270, 277 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (“It is the Legislature that is the
appropriate body to engage in the studied debate that must necessarily precede the
formulation of social policy with respect to same-sex marriage.”), aff’d, 820 N.Y.S.2d 890
(2006).
124. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 465; see also Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 361 (“[A]ny expansion
of the traditional definition of marriage should come from the Legislature.”).
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demonstrated that the exclusion of lesbian and gay couples from marriage reflected impermissible “prejudices against persons who are . . . homosexual.”125 In doing so, the court repudiated a once-popular view
“that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect” as nothing more than
a “destructive stereotype.”126 With the problem framed in this way, the
court then could characterize its role in rejecting the discriminatory marriage rule not as unrestrained activism, but rather as the fulfillment of its
duty as the “last instance” protector of constitutional rights.127 Similarly,
the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on state statutes and jurisprudence
mandating equality regardless of sexual orientation to conclude that
same- and different-sex couples must be accorded equal rights and benefits.128 “Over the last three decades,” the Court wrote, “through judicial
decisions and comprehensive legislative enactments, this State, step by
step, has protected gay and lesbian individuals from discrimination on
account of their sexual orientation.”129
One of several New York Supreme Court rulings on the state’s marriage law, which was later reversed by the state’s high court, likewise
treated the norm contest regarding the legal significance of sexual orientation differences as essentially over.130 The decision characterized its invalidation of the state’s different-sex requirement for marriage not as
staking out new normative territory, but as harmonizing with norms already settled by related jurisprudence and positive law in New York. Its
decision, the court wrote, was “consistent with the evolving public policy
as demonstrated in recent decisions of the Court of Appeals and other
New York courts, and actions taken by the State Legislature, the executive
branch and local governments.”131 Again, by characterizing the norm
125. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968.
126. Id. at 962 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 968 (finding that no rational basis
existed to justify state’s sex-based marriage restriction and that “the marriage restriction is
rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are . . . homosexual”).
The court also repudiated a normative preference for heterosexual relationships that
may have led other courts, albeit not overtly, to treat marriage recognition as more sacred,
and therefore less subject to compliance with the equal protection guarantee, than other
forms of state action. On this point, the court wrote, “Recognizing the right of an
individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of
opposite-sex marriage.” Id. at 965.
127. Id. at 966.
128. Lewis v. Harris, No. A-68-05, 2006 N.J. LEXIS 1521, at *57 (N.J. Oct. 25, 2006).
129. Id.; see also id. at *65 (“[T]his State’s decisional law and sweeping legislative
enactments, which protect gays and lesbians from sexual orientation discrimination in all
its virulent forms, provide committed same-sex couples with a strong interest in equality of
treatment relative to comparable heterosexual couples.”).
130. Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 597–607 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev’d, 805
N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2005), aff’d, 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006).
131. Id. at 607. Two other state supreme court justices, as well as the New York Court
of Appeals, disagreed, finding the contest to be sufficiently live that the issue of equal
marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples required legislative, not judicial, intervention.
See supra note 5.
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contest as over, the court positioned itself as having avoided undue intervention. Any other course, according to the court, would have contradicted the now-settled norm changes.
The popular intuition is that these latter decisions implicate courts
in norm selection while those that affirm the status quo do not. Hence
the vilification of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court following its
decision in Goodridge, which has been less focused on flaws in the court’s
reasoning than on the view that the court overstepped its bounds by finding for the plaintiffs.132
Yet the intuition is not correct, as the earlier discussion of the factbased adjudication model shows. The premise that courts can abstain
from shaping social norms and instead simply rely on facts about gay people to evaluate laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage is badly
misconceived. Affirming the “old” view of a social group represents as
much a selection among norms as affirming the “new” one. Put another
way, adherence to the status quo, however it is framed, does not neutralize either a court’s decisionmaking agency or the decision’s role in
strengthening one norm over the other.
Some might argue that even if norm selection is implicated in both
types of decisions, affirming the traditional norm is less intrusive because
it leaves the legislature room to act. But careful consideration shows that
decisions affirming the status quo can have a profound effect on the legislative process. Even decisions that refrain from explicitly reinforcing
traditional normative preferences for heterosexual couples strengthen
those norms by supplying legislators with reasons to block marriage rights
for same-sex couples. They provide opponents of equal marriage rights
with additional ballast for their claims that marriage by same-sex couples
A California superior court also looked to the norms reflected in extant state law,
including a state law providing “marriage-like rights,” to find that no legitimate purpose
could justify excluding same-sex couples from marriage:
California’s enactment of rights for same-sex couples belies any argument that
the State would have a legitimate interest in denying marriage in order to
preclude same-sex couples from acquiring some marital right that might
somehow be inappropriate for them to have. . . . [T]he State’s position that
California has granted marriage-like rights to same-sex couples points to the
conclusion that there is no rational basis in denying them the rites of marriage as
well.
In re Coordination Proceeding, Marriage Cases, Tentative Ruling, No. 4365, 2005 WL
583129, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005), rev’d, No. A110449, 2006 WL 2838121 (Cal.
App. Oct. 5, 2006); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 885 (Vt. 1999) (“In light of [the
state’s] express policy choices [equalizing treatment of gay and nongay parents], the state’s
arguments that Vermont public policy favors opposite-sex over same-sex parents or
disfavors the use of artificial reproductive technologies are patently without substance.”).
132. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 Mich. L. Rev.
431, 475–76 (2005) (noting that individuals such as Kenneth Starr, Karl Rove, and openly
gay commentator Andrew Sullivan criticized Goodridge as “the handiwork of arrogant
‘activist judges’ defying the will of the people” since “it was a court decision, rather than a
reform adopted by voters or popularly elected legislators”).
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is not appropriate, which in turn increases pressure on legislators to reject claims for equal marriage rights. Further, to the extent that the trajectory of legislative and other jurisprudential change is toward rejecting
distinctions based on sexual orientation, a decision affirming the traditional norm may derail or at least dampen that trend. Indeed, where
legislative and public policy shifts have eliminated most or all longstanding legal burdens on lesbians and gay men, courts that affirm the traditional negative norm in the marriage context arguably disrespect and disrupt the democratic process.133
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ON
JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE—SOME INSIGHTS
FROM FACT-BASED ADJUDICATION
In addition to exposing the superstructure that facilitates obfuscation of the judicial role as norm selector, the fact-based adjudication
model also focuses attention on how courts are influenced to revisit traditional “facts” about social groups and to contemplate tipping from one
view of a group to another. This section will first explore the significant
role of social scientists and social movements in shaping how courts perceive the reliability of “thick” facts and then turn to these extrajudicial
actors’ lesser role in reshaping views of “thin” facts.134
133. See infra notes 232–236 and accompanying text. A related, additional argument
suggests that where all barriers related to sexual orientation have been removed except in
marriage, a process deficiency, rather than rational judgment, has led to the retention of
discriminatory marriage rules. Cf. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 4–5 (1980)
(arguing that role of courts is to correct malfunctions in our political system). In this
situation, judicial actions that, on their surface, may appear antidemocratic because courts
are involved in overruling legislators are actually efforts to bring outlier legislation in line
with other legislative and jurisprudential commitments regarding the social group at issue.
By the same token, courts that reject the traditional norm and harmonize marriage
law with more recent developments rejecting distinctions based on sexual orientation also
are making a contestable normative judgment regarding the relevance of sexual
orientation to marriage. There is no question that these courts have an effect on the
public debate. What interests me here, however, is why courts that affirm tradition are not
also perceived to be making contestable, influential norm selections.
134. While movement advocates typically support the abolition of restrictions, social
scientists can often be found on opposing sides of cases. Some offer studies to justify views
that members of a social group are less able than their counterparts, and others seek to
show that traditional grounds for burdening members of the social group lack scientific
support. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Ass’n et al. in Support of
Plaintiffs-Respondents, supra note 50, at *2–*4 (“Empirical research has consistently
shown that lesbian and gay parents do not differ from heterosexuals in their parenting
skills, and their children do not show any deficits compared to children raised by
heterosexual parents.”); Brief of Amici Curiae James Q. Wilson, et al., Legal & Family
Scholars in Support of Defendants-Respondents at *1–*2, Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d 338 (No.
86), 2006 WL 1930158 (claiming that “relatively little is known from a scientific standpoint
about how children fare [when] raised by same-sex couples from birth, compared to [when
raised in] other family structures”); Brief of Dr. Paul McHugh, M.D. & Dr. M. Gawain
Wells, Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Respondents at *1–*2, Hernandez,
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A. Social Scientists and “Thick” Facts
At the height of its influence, social science research can destabilize
traditional views of social groups in two primary ways: first by providing
information to show that perceived facts are inaccurate, and second by
showing that bias has led to widespread acceptance of inaccurate facts
and skewed perceptions of group members’ status and capacity. The first
use is the classical one. Parties and amici submit studies to show the
court the “truth” about a group and courts use the information to bring a
fresh analysis to earlier views. The Court’s opinion in Taylor v. Louisiana,
for example, invoked Labor Department studies showing women’s heavy
workforce participation to support its decision to invalidate an automatic
jury service exemption for women, where similar exemptions had been
sustained in the past on grounds of women’s natural domesticity.135
Yet, as dissenters and scholars have argued, this familiar synergy between researchers and courts is also the most dubious because there is
little to prevent courts from randomly selecting data to support a given
conclusion and using that information out of context.136 Indeed, factbased adjudication facilitates the instrumental invocation of social science by enabling courts to rely upon facts without acknowledging or defending the normative and methodological assumptions of the cited
studies.
Beyond simply supplying data, social scientists may influence judicial
absorption of social change by identifying and explaining how bias and
misplaced normative judgments have distorted popular perceptions of
group members’ status and capacity.137 For example, heuristic devices of
7 N.Y.3d 338 (No. 86), 2006 WL 1930159 (“[T]here is no scientific consensus that
homosexuality is exclusively or primarily genetic in origin.”).
135. 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975).
136. See infra notes 166–175 and accompanying text (discussing critiques posed by
dissenters in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002), regarding process by which majority moved from fact to constitutional judgment
without acknowledgment of norms that shaped interpretation of evidence). See generally
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986) (identifying problems
caused by courts’ treatment of social science materials as fact and proposing ways for courts
to evaluate research); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in
Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655 (1988) (arguing that
facts should inform constitutional analysis but noting risks posed by courts’ use of facts).
137. Of course, the direct effect of any social scientific analyses of fact on adjudication
is limited largely to what litigators bring to courts’ attention. Often, this information
comes to courts through amicus curiae briefs filed by professional organizations such as
the American Psychological Association. See, e.g., Brief for the Massachusetts Psychiatric
Society et al. as Amici Curiae, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (No. 08860).
Moreover, as numerous scholars have noted, more or “better” information does not
necessarily lead people to change their views. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the
Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1241, 1252–54
(2002) (“A general awareness of our frail rationality, however, is not sufficient.”); Dan M.
Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 438 (1999) (“When
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cognitive psychology may be useful in showing that a widely accepted fact
about a social group rests on faulty premises because researchers
anchored themselves at an arbitrary starting point or ignored fundamentally conflicting facts.138 The California Supreme Court deployed social
science research in this way when it concluded that perceived facts about
racial differences, which had undergirded the state’s interracial marriage
ban, rested on “irrational fears.”139 Similarly, as discussed more fully below, cognitive psychology may assist analysis of the claim that heterosexual parents are preferable for children by raising questions about biased
anchoring, cognitive dissonance in the evaluation of research data, and
other methodological flaws.140
B. Social Movements and “Thick” Facts
Social movements likewise may destabilize “thick” facts by showing
the dissonance between perceived facts and the reality of individual
group members’ capacities.141 Indeed, providing realistic portrayals of
group members is a first-order task for many social movements, as eradication of legal barriers to equality is virtually impossible when ill treatment of group members can be justified by negative “thick” facts about
the group.142 If it is widely believed that African Americans are intellecasked to evaluate conflicting empirical studies, subjects credit those that confirm their
prior beliefs and dismiss those that conflict with them.”).
Questions have been raised separately regarding the utility of cognitive psychology as
it relates, more broadly, to issues of institutional design. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87
Cornell L. Rev. 616 passim (2002).
138. See, e.g., David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads,
and Informational Cascades, in The New Economics of Human Behavior 188, 193–200
(Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ieruli eds., 1995) (explaining biased anchoring, cascade
effects, and related phenomena).
Social science also may serve as a check on factual perceptions held by the general
public as well as by other researchers. Its potential revelatory benefit separately motivates
arguments in the employment discrimination context that decisionmakers’ biases are often
not apparent. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan.
L. Rev. 1161, 1174–75 (1995) (arguing that changes in jurisprudential conclusions on
causes of discrimination parallel and were likely influenced by evolving views of
psychologists).
139. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948); see also supra text
accompanying notes 88–92 (discussing Perez).
140. See, e.g., Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 47 (discussing and critiquing studies); see
also Stephen A. Newman, The Use and Abuse of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage
Debate, 49 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 537 passim (2004) (criticizing use of social science to make
determinations of child welfare in discourse and adjudication regarding marriage rights
for same-sex couples).
141. The suggestion here that some perceptions are more accurate than others is
offered with the awareness that the concept of accuracy itself is temporally contingent.
142. Since the rise of NAACP Legal Defense Fund in the 1930s and other identitybased legal groups in the 1970s, groups have sought directly to have courts invalidate laws
that rest on flawed beliefs about group members. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Rainbow
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tually inferior or that women are not physically capable of full-time
workforce participation,143 for example, regardless of empirical data to
the contrary, courts will be likely to sustain classifications drawn based on
race or sex.
Movement advocates thus have a special role in working with professional organizations and other elite opinion setters to show that negative
norm-laden “facts” are untrue. For example, one of the first efforts of the
contemporary gay movement was to challenge the American Psychiatric
Association’s listing of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.144 Absent that
change, most challenges to government action distinguishing between
gay and nongay people would have been destined to lose because the
“fact” of mental illness could justify innumerable restrictions on gay people’s lives. Organizations that advocate on behalf of people with mental
retardation likewise have worked strenuously to counter mainstream
skepticism about the capacity of their constituents that, in turn, has been
relied upon by courts to sustain legal burdens.145 Similarly, the “facts”
Rights: The Role of Lawyers and Courts in the Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights Movement
(2000); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers
Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution (1994). My focus here is not on gauging the efficacy
of legal intervention in achieving movement goals, but rather on identifying with
specificity the particular ways in which the work of social movements may shape judicial
responses to claims of societal change. For discussion of the former, see, e.g., Michael J.
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial
Equality (2004); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case
of Affirmative Action, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1436, 1490–1511 (2005); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419
(2001).
143. While this view was associated with the capacity of white, middle- and upper-class
women, in particular, courts that sustained sex-based classifications based on “facts” related
to women’s capacity did not acknowledge this distinction.
144. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79
Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1582–83 (1993) (“Because the medical profession’s definitions of illness
can have meaningful legal consequences, this victory within the American Psychiatric
Association was equivalent to winning an important test case in the courts.” (footnote
omitted)); Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Incorporation and Cinematic Reflections of
Psychological Conceptions of Homosexuality, 70 UMKC L. Rev. 495, 541 (2002) (stating
that “[t]he elimination of the stigma of mental disease has had a significant influence” on
“recognizing the legal rights of homosexuals”); Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the
Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 Law & Sexuality 1, 26–27 (2003) (describing
“the elimination of diagnosis” of homosexuality as mental disorder as “a necessary step to
secure equal rights for gay men and lesbians”).
145. See, e.g., Brief of the American Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)
(No. 92-351) (“The stereotype of individuals with mental retardation as ‘perpetual
children’ has long been part of the justification for what this Court has recognized as a
‘grotesque’ history of mistreatment.”); Brief of Voice of the Retarded (VOR) et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17, Heller, 509 U.S. 312 (No. 92-351) (“By failing to
recognize the great differences . . . between mental illness and mental retardation and
between those subgroups of people within each category and by failing to address the
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referred to above regarding the limitations of African Americans and women had to be destabilized before equality claims could succeed.
In the current social climate, the assertion that gay people are less
suitable role models for children than nongay people presents this issue
yet again. To the extent that the assertion is treated as “fact,” governments can restrict gay people from adopting or marrying (if marriage is
treated as the state’s preferred foundation for childrearing). While social
scientists undertake studies to show that this view reflects a norm, not a
fact, social movement leaders organize public education campaigns, conduct media outreach, and advocate within professional, expert organizations to raise awareness of the lives of gay people in general and gay parents in particular.146 As with the mental illness delisting, efforts at law
reform in this area can be successful only if the negative “facts” about gay
parents are denaturalized and discredited.
A movement that successfully publicizes a “new” view of a social
group may, in addition, prompt social scientists and others to investigate
standing views within their professions, thereby fostering synergies between social movements and researchers. A recent report by the American Academy of Pediatrics, for example, which concluded that marriage
by same-sex couples serves, rather than undermines, children’s best interests,147 would not likely have been produced absent societal changes
sparked by the social movement for marriage equality. These new facts
and the Academy’s related position feed back into the adjudication process by encouraging judges to revisit previously accepted “thick” facts.
C. Extrajudicial Actors and “Thin” Facts
Even if social scientists and social movements can disprove “thick”
norm-laden facts to the point where courts cannot credibly cite them,
they have considerably less ability to destabilize the association between
“thin” empirical facts and their associated norms. This is in part because
the facts themselves matter little in these cases. The facts, instead, stand
in for unspoken, typically negative, judgments about group members’ status or capacity. Those judgments, because they exert their influence in
the guise of “soft” norms rather than “hard” “thick” facts, remain both
more elusive to identify and harder to challenge.
Justice O’Connor made this point in Nguyen—the different roles of
men and women in childbirth relied on by the majority were standing in
for a traditional, debunked belief that women were better nurturers of
their children than men and thus more likely to cultivate loyal American
sharply different support requirements for each group and subgroup . . . lower courts
demonstrate a misunderstanding of developmental disabled people and their needs.”).
146. See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, Raising Children: Lesbian and Gay Parents Face the
Public and the Courts, in Creating Change: Sexuality, Public Policy, and Civil Rights
305–07 (John D’Emilio et al. eds., 2000).
147. See James G. Pawelski et al., The Effects of Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic
Partnership Laws on the Health and Well-Being of Children, 118 Pediatrics 349 (2006).
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citizens.148 Likewise, today, many courts may be reluctant to cite the
widely debunked “fact” that gay people are harmful to children.149 Yet
these courts will rely upon empirical facts regarding the comparative procreative capacities of gay and nongay couples to do the same normative
work of enshrining a preference for heterosexuality.150 Because the normative judgments hover around the “thin” facts but are not integrated
into them, as is the case with “thick” facts, they are less susceptible to
evidentiary challenges and rational arguments by researchers and
advocates.
This is not to suggest that scientists and movement advocates have no
influence on “thin” fact-based adjudication; rather, their effect on judicial
integration of social change will be more attenuated. Instead of exerting
influence directly by exposing flaws in factual perceptions, as can be done
for “thick” facts, the best that social scientists and movement advocates
can do in these cases is engage in broader, society-wide efforts to discredit
the negative norms associated with “thin” facts. Yet the challenges to normative judgments can begin to gain traction only after “thick” facts have
been displaced. Consequently, the norm challenges may be understood
best as a second-order task of social movements or social scientists to follow the first-order task of correcting misperceptions. Similarly, research
and advocacy that discredit “facts” may well create space for courts to
148. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 88–89 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The claim
that [the statute] substantially relates to the achievement of the goal of a ‘real, practical
relationship’ thus finds support not in biological differences but instead in a stereotype—
i.e., ‘the generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers . . . to
develop caring relationships with their children.’” (citation omitted)).
149. Twenty years ago, courts were far more likely to take this position. See, e.g.,
Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“It is inconceivable that
[the children] could go into that environment [where the father lived with his male
partner], be exposed to this relationship and not suffer some emotional disturbance,
perhaps severe.” (citation omitted)); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (“The
father’s continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship [with
another man] renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.”).
150. While the New York Court of Appeals did accept as legitimate a preference for
heterosexual parents over different-sex couples as parents, it identified the “thin” fact of
procreative capacity as an independently sufficient rationale for the law’s classification.
Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359–60 (2006). The Washington State Supreme Court
made the same move in Andersen v. King County, No. 75934-1, 2006 Wash. LEXIS 598, at
*54 (Wash. July 26, 2006).
This reliance on empirical rather than contested “thick” facts is also evident in
litigation strategy. For example, in defending New York’s exclusionary marriage law, the
City of New York offered procreation as a justification for the law’s classification, yet
disavowed the position of disapproving of gay people as parents. Brief for the Appellant at
45, Hernandez v. Robles, 811 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div. 2006) (No. 103434/2004). As shown
earlier, since procreative capacity alone cannot explain the law’s different treatment of gay
and nongay people, it is difficult to understand the procreation argument as linked to
anything other than a preference for heterosexuals as parents. Yet, for political or other
reasons, the city apparently felt it could not embrace that position. Consequently, it
proffered the empirical facts of procreation to do its unspoken normative work. Id. at
45–46.
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reconsider traditional norms that rested on those “facts,” while arguments focused on challenging the norms themselves are less likely to tip a
court from one position to another.
V. THEORIZING JUDICIAL NORM AVOIDANCE
This section considers the pragmatic and theoretical conditions that
lead judges to write opinions as though facts alone could possibly explain
decisions about restrictions on social groups when we know that normative judgments are necessary to make sense of relevant facts.151 Legal
process legitimacy concerns,152 legal realist outcome-oriented goals, and
the peculiarities of the human mind are all, to varying degrees, consistent
with a preference for fact-based adjudication.
In addition, I suggest that regardless of which theory one embraces,
an overarching institutional interest in maximizing flexibility for future
decisionmaking must be counted as an additional factor contributing to
the judicial preference for fact-based decisions when the status of a social
group is in contest. This section will consider the deep link between factbased adjudication and this core institutional interest. Part VI will then
work from this foundation to evaluate the risks and gains of displacing
fact-based decisions with greater candor regarding norm choices.
A. Fact-Based Adjudication and Theories of Judicial Review and
Decisionmaking
Legal process, legal realist, and socio-psychological theories can each
largely, but not completely, explain why courts resort to a decisionmaking
151. For legal realist-oriented analyses, see generally Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (1977); Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and
Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (1988). Not all of these statements are
critical of the underlying judgment; cf. Black, supra note 86, at 430 (“Opinions . . . may
leave much to be desired . . . . But the judgments, in law and in fact, are as right and true as
any that ever was uttered.”).
152. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1396 (1996) (explaining that,
under legal process theory, “only issues that can be resolved by [reasoned argument] are
appropriate for judicial resolution. When courts go beyond this role, they endanger their
legitimacy as legal institutions [by asserting] an unjustifiable claim to political superiority,
and [acting] beyond their area of competence” (footnote omitted)); see also G. Edward
White, The Path of American Jurisprudence, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1212, 1247–49 (1976)
(discussing development of legal process theory).
Critiques of the legal process paradigm have spawned more elaborate and nuanced
analysis of the relationship between the judiciary and the other branches. See, e.g.,
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 875,
895–96, 925–35 (2003) (arguing that process theory “highlights but does not resolve the
indeterminacy problem” because “extramajoritarian mechanisms for setting the ground
rules” rely on same “controversial moral judgments” that process theory is meant to avoid);
Rubin, supra, at 1398–1401, 1412–13 (describing critical legal studies and law and
economics critiques of legal process theory, particularly as related to claims about
relationship of judicial and political branches).
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approach that lacks a well-reasoned premise.153 This subsection explores
the strengths and limitations first of process theory and then, more
briefly, of legal realist and socio-psychological theories as explanations for
fact-based adjudication.
1. Legal Process-Based Explanations. — If we accept the assumption of
legal process theory that courts act with awareness of their limited capacity and genuine concern for their legitimacy (either in the eyes of the
general public or their elite peers), fact-based adjudication makes a good
deal of sense. First, norms are more difficult to identify than facts. Second, norm choices are typically more contestable than fact choices. And
third, courts are less vulnerable to criticism of overstepping if they make
decisions based on relatively uncontested facts and avoid staking out positions among competing norms. I will address each point in turn, illustrating the ways that capacity and legitimacy concerns interact synergistically
to reinforce the preference for facts over norms.
For courts sensitive to their limited capacity to ascertain social
trends, the project of identifying norms and norm changes has an amorphous, almost anthropological quality to it as compared to the project of
fact identification. Because a norm signifies a societal judgment, determining a norm’s contours requires delving into the inner life of a community, a task for which courts are notoriously ill-suited from a legal process perspective.154 For example, when Brown presented the Court with
the option of evaluating either the facts or the prevailing norm related to
school segregation (or both), the Court opted exclusively for the former.155 Likewise, in Reed v. Reed, the Court never even addressed the
normative preference for men embraced by the Idaho Supreme Court
and focused only on facts regarding women’s experience administering
estates.156 Instead of a heartfelt discussion of the challenges of norm
identification, the Court favored a quick, lean reference to established
facts.
The focus on judicial capacity limitations triggers concerns not only
about identifying norms at a general level, but also about the challenges
of reaching agreement on a norm’s precise contours. Was the norm underlying Brown the understanding that differences between African
153. See infra Parts V.A.1 & V.A.2.
154. Justice Scalia made much of this judicial capacity issue in his Roper v. Simmons
dissent, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For further discussion of this
critique, see infra text accompanying notes 169–171.
The development and use of juries could be said to reinforce this point, even with
their focus on adjudicative rather than legislative facts, to the extent that juries are
understood to bring into the judicial process a more accurate sense of community norms
than judges might bring to bear. On the other hand, the fact that the use of juries has
dropped off dramatically might be read to suggest that courts have become more adept at
assessing norms. See generally William L. Dwyer, In the Hands of the People: The Trial
Jury’s Origins, Triumphs, Troubles and Future in American Democracy (2001).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 81–86.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 93–96.
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Americans and whites in public education were irrelevant? Or was it a
commitment to the irrelevance of racial differences across all races and
contexts? If the norm related specifically to changed views of African
Americans, then did the new norm reflect a belief that African Americans
and whites had equal capacities? Or did it reflect a belief that real differences existed but should not be reinforced by law? Even to the extent
individual justices believed they had properly identified the norm, law
lacks the tools of anthropology or political science that might enable the
(somewhat) effective measurement of one norm’s popularity vis-à-vis another. Cohering on a vision of facts is a far simpler task.
Legitimacy concerns reinforce these capacity-driven intuitions in several ways. First, because facts are more measurable, more easily established, and more subject to testing and verification than norms, accepting
“thick” facts that are obviously untrue risks damaging a court’s credibility.
If the observable evidence belies the “thick” fact that children of interracial couples are incapable of reproducing, for example, reliance on that
reproductive “fact” will undermine the court’s authority as factfinder.157
Concerns with legitimacy thus not only reinforce judicial inclinations to
embrace societal changes, but also pressure courts to abandon portrayals
of social groups that differ substantially from broadly accepted perceptions.158 This may be true even if the portrayal is a longstanding one
157. A recent case assessing the scope of maritime jurisdiction, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14 (2004), illustrates this point in a different context. At
issue was whether maritime jurisdiction would encompass the “new era” of technological
change in cargo container transportation. Id. at 25 (quoting Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1
Admiralty & Maritime Law 589 (4th ed. 2004)). The Court wrote:
While it may once have seemed natural to think that only contracts embodying
commercial obligations between the “tackles” (i.e., from port to port) have
maritime objectives, the shore is now an artificial place to draw a line. Maritime
commerce has evolved along with the nature of transportation and is often
inseparable from some land-based obligations.
Id. We might guess at the nature of the norms that enabled the Court to move from one
vision of maritime jurisdiction to another—perhaps it was a commitment to realism over
formalism or a judgment that the nation would benefit from broadening the reach of
federal law in this area. For our purposes here, though, the specific norm or norms that
guided understandings of the fact of the changed technology is unimportant; what matters
is that the Court seemed to conclude that the norms did not require mention as part of its
decision to abandon one set of facts for another.
158. This observation may have only limited value outside the context of facts related
to social groups. For example, many of the facts on which evidence law is based do not
have empirical support, yet the law has not transformed in ways that are more responsive to
known facts. See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to “Truth”: The Legal Mythology of
Dying Declarations, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 229, 259 (1998) (observing that “[n]one of the[ ]
considerations” that support dying declaration exception to hearsay rule “rest on any
relevant empirical evidence or study of the matter”). Because evidence law is a subject that
tends to be accessible and of interest mainly to litigators, criminal defendants, and other
parties to litigation, its factually inaccurate assumptions are less likely to become known by
the general public, and are, therefore, less likely to raise doubts about judicial capacity
than incorrect characterizations of social groups.
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and the subject of the “new” fact is unpopular in the surrounding
society.159
Declaration of norms raises legitimacy concerns that mirror those
just discussed. Because norm shifts are not verifiable in the same ways as
are changes to facts, a court that declares a norm, whether old or new,
runs a greater risk of criticism that it has declared the norm incorrectly
than when it relies on facts that are either uncontested or not yet widely
seen as contestable. Selecting an accepted fact, whether “thick” or “thin,”
to stand in for its norm choice seems on the surface to be a good strategy
for courts to avoid or at least minimize this problem.
Moreover, norm declarations raise potential problems regarding the
court’s role relative to that of the legislature. A court that explicitly rejects the dominant norm risks accusations that it has substituted its normative preferences for those of the people, a disfavored countermajoritarian move. Although courts that openly affirm dominant norms might
intuitively appear to escape this problem, they run related legitimacy risks
as well. If the traditional norm has been destabilized, then a court’s overt
embrace of it could be cast as driven not by reasoned analysis but rather
by individual judges’ desires to stem the tides of change. Affirmation of
the popular norm might also threaten legitimacy if the court appears to
be categorically accepting majoritarian preferences rather than conducting meaningful judicial review.160 Much of the vigorous criticism directed at the Court’s overt reliance on majoritarian normative preferences in Bowers v. Hardwick, for example, makes these points.161 In this
light, fact-based decisionmaking appears to offer a welcome escape.
159. If a community remained invested deeply in a traditional “thick” fact, then a
court would not necessarily be compelled to embrace the “new” knowledge, even if that
information persuasively destabilized the old “fact.” In this respect, courts have discretion
either to embrace change, which they can do credibly by highlighting empirical evidence
that discredits the old fact, or ignore “new” evidence and embrace the fact that is popular
in the surrounding community. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), might be said to
reflect the latter option. In sustaining Virginia’s antimiscegenation law, the Virginia
Supreme Court acknowledged the California Supreme Court’s observation in Perez that
interracial marriage “could not be considered vitally detrimental to public health and
morals.” Id. at 753 (citing Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 31 (Cal. 1948) (Carter, J.,
concurring)). It rejected that view, however, and embraced instead the fact that interracial
marriage would produce a “mongrel breed of citizens,” linking its validation of Virginia’s
antimiscegenation law to historical fact: “[H]istory teach[es] that nations and races have
better advanced in human progress when they cultivated their own distinctive
characteristics and culture and developed their own peculiar genius.” Id. at 756.
160. This is true even under the limited scope of rational basis review.
161. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L.J. 1073,
1096–97 (1988) (criticizing Justice White for relying on “‘the presumed belief of a majority
of the Georgia electorate that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable’” without
“attempt[ing] to identify any harm caused by consensual adult sodomy” (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003))).

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

1998

unknown

Seq: 44

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

20-NOV-06

13:58

[Vol. 106:1955

Death penalty cases can help illuminate the legal process-related
risks of norm declarations because the governing Eighth Amendment
doctrine, which requires that the Court measure the death penalty
against the nation’s “evolving standards of decency,”162 makes norm declaration unavoidable. In the cases considered here, Roper v. Simmons and
Atkins v. Virginia, dissenters and commentators advanced blistering critiques regarding the Court’s capacity and legitimacy in connection with its
alleged failure to discern and apply the correct norm.
In Roper v. Simmons, the majority declared a “national consensus
against the death penalty for juveniles.”163 It hinged that declaration on
“objective indicia,” including “the rejection of the juvenile death penalty
in the majority of the States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of
the practice.”164 The Court found, too, that social science evidence of
juveniles’ “diminished culpability” relative to adults reinforced this position.165 With this approach, the Court implied that the facts, and not the
Justices’ personal preferences, mandated the decision.
But facts alone cannot demonstrate consensus, as the dissents illustrate (and as we know from analysis of the fact-based adjudication
model). Judges must make normative judgments regarding the significance (i.e., relevance and weight) given to any particular fact. Justice
O’Connor, for example, accused the majority of misreading the facts and
deriving the wrong norm. The majority’s facts, she wrote, “fail[ed] to
demonstrate conclusively that any [genuine national] consensus has
emerged in the brief period” since the Court sustained the juvenile death
penalty in 1989.166 She characterized the pace of change as “halting”
rather than consistent167 and found the majority’s analysis of the culpability of juvenile offenders to “def[y] common sense.”168 Justice Scalia,
162. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence commands the Court to identify social norms
in the form of decency standards against which particular applications of the death penalty
must be weighed. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561–63 (2005) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) (discussing “[t]he inquiry into our society’s evolving
standards of decency”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (quoting Trop, 356
U.S. at 101) (agreeing that Eighth Amendment claims must be judged by this standard).
163. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. These indicia, the Court found, “provide sufficient
evidence that today our society views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.’” Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
164. Id. at 564. The Court has said that enactments of legislatures are “[t]he clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331 (1989). Disagreement, unrelated to the point here, exists as to whether and to
what extent judges should consider their own judgment as well. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s view that “[t]he Constitution . . . contemplates
that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eight Amendment.” (quoting id. at 312
(majority opinion))).
165. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
166. Id. at 588 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 597.
168. Id. at 602.
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also dissenting, declared the majority’s use of facts to identify a norm
change to be “implausible.”169 Since the Court’s earlier ruling on the
issue, Justice Scalia pointed out that a “number of legislatures and voters
have expressly affirmed their support for capital punishment of 16- and
17-year-old offenders.”170 Going further, he questioned the legitimacy of
the Court’s decision, directly accusing the majority of deciding the case
based on personal preferences: “[A]ll the court has done today . . . is to
look over the heads of the crowd and pick out its friends.”171
A similar dynamic undergirded Atkins v. Virginia.172 For the Atkins
majority, a consensus against the use of capital punishment for people
with mental retardation had emerged among “the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges.”173 Justice Scalia, in dissent, declared the majority’s identification of a norm based on those sources to be “empty
talk”174 and charged that the majority had relied instead on its “feelings
and intuition.”175
While Roper and Atkins do not prove conclusively that a desire to
avoid legal process-oriented criticism drives courts’ preference for facts,
imagine, counterfactually, that these were equal protection cases in which
no norm declaration was required. Under the fact-based adjudication
model, the majority could have held simply that empirical studies regarding culpability justified banning the death penalty in these contexts. In
this scenario, any criticism of the majority’s legitimacy or capacity to draw
that conclusion from the studies first would have to show that the studies
themselves did not generate the Court’s conclusion, but rather that the
majority had exercised its own normative judgment in evaluating them.
By contrast, where norm declaration is required, as in the death penalty
cases, critics do not have the burden of showing the norm choices for
which the facts are standing in and can move directly to a legal processstyle condemnation of the Court’s norm selection.
Legal process concerns with institutional constraints thus seem, at
least superficially, to provide a neat and comprehensive explanation for
fact-based decisionmaking. Because fact-based reasoning places an extra
barrier that must be overcome before would-be detractors can criticize a
169. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 613.
171. Id. at 617; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic, New Republic, Mar. 21, 2005, at
11, 11–12 (criticizing majority’s conclusion that international norms almost universally
oppose application of death penalty to juveniles).
172. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
173. Id. at 307, 316. The Court also pointed to social science evidence to conclude
that people with mental retardation have diminished culpability. Id. at 318–19 &
nn.23–24. (“Their deficiencies . . . diminish their personal culpability.”).
174. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, focused criticism on the majority’s
reliance on “international opinion, the views of professional and religious organizations,
and opinion polls not demonstrated to be reliable.” Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
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court’s legitimacy and capacity, courts are less vulnerable to criticism of
overstepping by hinging decisions on relatively uncontested facts and
avoiding overt selection among competing norms.176
On the other hand, fact-based adjudication of contested social group
cases has not fooled the critics, who typically step quickly past whatever
facts the courts cite and focus instead on decisions’ normative moves. To
the extent the public pays attention to the Supreme Court’s actions, it
reacts to holdings, not reasoning.177 Likewise, fact-based decisions have
not insulated majorities from stiff challenges by those in academia, the
judiciary, or the bar. Critics regularly recognize norm shifts and often
rest their rebukes for those shifts on concerns about judicial capacity and
legitimacy.178 It is hard to imagine, for example, that the criticism aimed
at Brown and Romer would have diminished had the Court acknowledged
the decisions’ normative underpinnings. In short, while legal process
theory goes a long way toward explaining the attraction of fact-based adjudication, it does not provide a complete story.
2. Explanations from Legal Realism. — Legal realism’s explanation for
fact-based adjudication is far less complex than that of legal process theory. Simply put, to the extent that reliance on facts is more defensible
than reliance on norms, fact-based decisions reduce pressure on courts to
explain their reasoning. This, in turn, provides strong cover for outcomeoriented judges who are concerned less with fine-tuning their legal analysis than with reaching a preferred result and protecting that result from
reversal on appeal.
The cover-up theory, however, also does not tell a complete story. As
just noted, in controversial cases, the public pays attention to outcomes,
176. There is little evidence that courts actually believe themselves to be incapable of
discerning norms. The Eighth Amendment cases discussed above illustrate that the
conflict on the Court is not at all about whether judges are capable of discerning norms,
but rather about the norms that are chosen. See supra notes 162–175 and accompanying
text. Indeed, there is no shortage of cases outside the Eighth Amendment context in
which courts declare norms and treat them as decisive, as shown above. The phenomenon
through which fact-based decisions precede norm declarations illustrates a judicial
preference for delaying explicit norm selection until the court perceives the norms have
been settled, but not for avoiding such questions altogether.
177. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
2008, 2028–30 (2002) (describing how Supreme Court decisions are usually disseminated
through summaries in media reports).
178. For example, despite the Court’s reliance on facts to support its decision in
Brown, commentators, both approving and disapproving, treated the decision as evidence
of a normative shift regarding the legal treatment of African Americans. Compare Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 32–34
(1959) (arguing that cases depended upon categorical judgment that segregation is
inherently discriminatory and expressing reservations about that proposition), with Black,
supra note 86, at 421, 424–29 (approving notion that cases depended upon determination
that segregation, as implemented, violated equality guarantee). Separately, Cass Sunstein
has argued that the Court often leaves underlying principles unacknowledged and instead
offers decisions that are “minimalist” instead of “more deeply theorized.” Sunstein,
Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 18, at 63–64 (using Romer as example).
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not reasoning. If it is inclined to believe that a judge followed his or her
personal preferences, then an opinion’s focus on facts will not alleviate
that concern. Legal analysts and dissenters, too, look beyond the stated
reasons for a ruling and, in contested cases, often conclude that judicial
opinions are nothing more than poor masks for judges’ ideological
preferences.179
Under this theory, therefore, fact-based adjudication does not succeed as a strategy for insulating courts from criticisms of outcome orientation in cases involving the status of contested social groups, much like it
does not insulate courts from capacity- and legitimacy-based critiques
when decisions result in norm shifts.
This is not to suggest that institutional constraints and outcomerelated aims have no effect on adjudicators. Judges may, at times, issue
fact-based decisions precisely because those decisions will be less likely to
trigger criticism, or at least less likely to trigger as much criticism—either
from the public or the bar—than overtly normative decisions. But since
neither theory fully explains why courts embrace a decisionmaking approach that rests on a fictional premise that facts alone can resolve cases,
we must consider whether the judicial impulse toward fact-oriented resolution reflects not so much an instrumental strategic choice as the limitations of the human psyche.
3. Social Psychology and Cognitive Science. — Cognitive science suggests
that fact-based intervention neither reflects institutional constraints nor
functions as a mask for result orientation, but instead corresponds to the
way that human beings, including judges, change their views about social
groups.180 Most often, popular judgments about a disdained group shift
when group members’ successful workforce participation or societal contribution becomes widely known.181 Only later do people become cognizant that the “new” information has reshaped their normative judgments
about group members’ status or capacity.182 In other words, time often
179. See supra notes 61–69, 177–178 and accompanying text.
180. See generally Krieger, supra note 138 (arguing that discrimination is often not
intentional, but emerges naturally from normal cognitive functioning); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987) (asserting that racism is often unintentional and
results from socialization). Cf. Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: How Workplace
Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy 60–101 (2003) (addressing ways in which
workplace interactions shape views of racial and gender differences).
181. For a description of the cognitive resistance to change, see Anthony Page,
Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L.
Rev. 155, 202 (2005) (“[L]earned patterns prove remarkably resistant to change. Once the
unconscious has detected an initial correlation, a person will continue to behave as though
the correlation exists long after it has disappeared. . . . [A] person cannot consciously
articulate the reasons for his behavior.” (footnotes omitted)).
182. Blasi, supra note 137, at 1279 (“[T]here is evidence that stereotype change can
result from exposure to ‘people who moderately disconfirm perceivers’ stereotypes of their
group.’ Cognitive social psychologists attribute the decline in stereotypes about Irish
Americans, for example, to the effects of these processes over time.” (footnote omitted)
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lags between the public’s awareness that the true facts about a group differ from what once was believed and changes to norms that arose from
those now-debunked facts. This would suggest that some judges genuinely may believe that facts alone can explain their judgments and that
fact-based adjudication is not just a strategic, instrumental mechanism for
minimizing criticism or respecting individual constraints. Instead, on this
theory, fact-based adjudication is a byproduct of people’s ability to absorb
new factual information more quickly than they can reshape their underlying conceptions to correspond to the new information.183
But while the “nature of social change” theory may explain why some
judges cannot see that their reasoning reflects outdated norms,184 surely
courts are often well aware of their rulings’ normative dimensions. To
return to Brown and Romer, for a moment, there can be little question
that the Court was well aware of those decisions’ normative dimensions
given the intensity of public opinion about race discrimination at the
time of Brown and gay rights at the time of Romer.
Even if fact-based adjudication does not stem solely from the way in
which the unconscious mind adapts to change, it arguably reflects the
cognitive constraints that lead people to prefer fact comparisons to the
psychologically more complex and anxiety-producing work of norm analysis. Because they are observable or measurable, as noted earlier, facts
appear relatively easier to compare and contrast. Norms, on the other
hand, are less than ideal comparators because of their amorphous, if not
incommensurable, nature. The preference for fact-based adjudication
can thus be traced to the greater human capacity for factual comparisons
as opposed to norm comparisons.
The power of this theory, however, rests partly on our being unaware
of our cognitive preferences. Yet a significant body of cognitive psychological literature focuses on developing ways to expedite the revelation of
biases and minimize their effect on decisionmaking.185 In setting out the
(quoting Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 390 (1990))). Brown
arguably illustrates how the Justices are subject to this phenomenon. See Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1954) (observing that stereotypes about African Americans at
time of Plessy v. Ferguson existed in large part because laws forbade their education, while
now, “many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as
in the business and professional world” (footnote omitted)).
183. See Blasi, supra note 137, at 1256–57 (“If we store social categories in our heads
by means of prototypes or exemplars rather than statistics, then our basic cognitive
mechanisms not only predispose us to stereotypes . . . but also limit the potentially curative
effect of information.”).
184. In Nguyen, for example, the majority expressed seemingly authentic disbelief at
being called sexist by the dissent. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001). Although one
could argue that the majority was willfully ignoring the dissent’s point, I read the majority’s
response as failing to take issue with the dissent’s claim of sex-based bias because it simply
does not grasp or find credible the dissent’s point. Cf. Page, supra note 181, at 229–35
(describing common lack of self-awareness with regard to reliance upon stereotypes).
185. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1507–14
(2005) (discussing various ways psychologists measure implicit biases).

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

2006]

unknown

Seq: 49

20-NOV-06

CONSTITUTIONAL TIPPING POINTS

13:58

2003

many ways in which cognitive processes shape our reactions to information, this work reinforces the deep flaw in the premise that facts alone
can decide cases. Thus, while resorting to facts may be a natural instinct,
research suggests that we should, in effect, know better than to continue
to accept the widespread use of fact-based adjudication.
B. Fact-Based Adjudication in the Service of Institutional Interest: A
Methodology That Preserves Judicial Flexibility
While each of the theories just discussed helps explain the operation
of fact-based adjudication, a theory focusing on the courts’ institutional
interest in preserving flexibility for future decisionmaking fills in some of
the gaps noted above.186 This theory claims that avoiding norm declarations where the status of a social group is contested minimizes the risk of
having to reverse course in later cases as the dominant norm evolves or
settles.187 Because norms typically express views about a social group’s
status or capacity that extend beyond the confines of an individual case,
courts must either follow or distinguish between them when deciding
cases involving that group’s members. But, especially where norms are in
flux, a court might want to reject a norm in one context, but not necessarily in another. Focusing on the facts presents an attractive solution in
these contexts because a fact-intensive decision can curtail the reach of
stare decisis considerations.188
Decisions that openly declare norm shifts thus not only expose
courts to criticism for inappropriate and inept interventions in cultural
debates, but also limit judicial freedom to maneuver in future cases. Consider Reed v. Reed, discussed above, in which the Court never mentioned
its rejection of the Idaho Supreme Court’s normative judgment that natural differences189 between men and women justified an estate administration law subordinating wives to husbands.190 If the U.S. Supreme Court
had unraveled norm from fact and overtly declared the natural domesticity norm to be impermissible, the Court would have disabled, or at least
severely limited, the use of “natural” sex differences to justify government
action in other cases. This is a position the Court was, and still remains,
186. See supra notes 177–179.
187. Cf. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or
Controversy” Requirement, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 304 (1979) (observing that judicial
restraint can best be explained by “the relationships among courts over time” and
desirability of practices that prevent early courts from “t[ying] the hands of subsequent
ones”).
188. The literature on judicial minimalism illustrates the existence of this approach,
but does not explore the particular incentives courts have to make minimalist decisions in
the context considered here. See, e.g., Sunstein, Leavings Things Undecided, supra note
18, at 89–101 (arguing that Court should avoid “broad ruling[s]” on several contentious
issues, including marriage for same-sex couples).
189. Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho 1970).
190. 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
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unwilling to take.191 Thus, apart from generating legal process concerns,
overt rejection of traditional judgments about women’s natural inclinations would create a new doctrinal barrier to sex-based rules. While
courts could surmount the barrier, they would need to address it in all
future cases. By contrast, it would be relatively easy for a future court to
isolate and distinguish a fact-based decision as a context-specific
judgment.
Even rejecting “natural” differences in the narrow context of sexbased estate administration rules would have been risky compared to an
analysis hinged on “thin” facts. The recognition of a norm change, however limited, would trigger the question in future cases whether “natural”
differences could ever justify sex-based distinctions.192 By not acknowledging its rejection of the norm, the Court enabled itself and lower
courts to deal with the relevance of “natural” differences on a case by case
basis.
As illustrated by the Reed counterfactual described above, adjudicators who reject a group-related norm in one context make it difficult, at
best, to resuscitate that norm in a related case. In this respect,
majoritarian bodies are not similarly situated because they do not face the
pressure for consistency imposed by stare decisis principles. As Justice
Scalia observed in Lawrence,
[T]he people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion. The people may feel that their disapprobation
of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosex191. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (acknowledging that “[t]he
difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one”);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471–73 (1981) (upholding statute that
subjected only men to criminal liability for statutory rape).
192. While the way in which a court articulates its standard for reviewing certain
classifications also can be more or less constraining (i.e., a norm of skepticism via
heightened scrutiny will be more limiting to future decisionmaking than a norm that social
group-based distinctions can survive if they are reasonable), my focus here is on whether
courts constrain themselves by the way they evaluate government interests, whatever the
applicable standard of review. As we have seen, whether under heightened or rational
basis review, the Court has tended toward fact-based decisions whenever a particular
normative judgment about a social group appeared to be in contest, and, even under the
highest levels of review, government reliance on the protected trait sometimes is sustained.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Further, as Justice Scalia pointed out, the
explicit rejection of the moral disapproval norm in Lawrence will make it far more difficult
for the Court to resuscitate that norm to sustain a distinction based on sexual orientation
in a future case, notwithstanding that rational basis review may be applied. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). While we may see efforts to
cabin Lawrence and reassert acceptance of the moral disapproval norm, my guess is that we
are more likely to see decisions relying either on other normative judgments about gay
people or on fact-based distinctions, such as those related to the procreative capacity of
same- and different-sex couples. The recent opinions by state courts in marriage cases bear
this out, with morality left largely unmentioned while procreative facts and normative
support for tradition serve as widely accepted justifications. See supra notes 49, 150 and
accompanying text.
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ual marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts—and may legislate accordingly. The Court today
pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of action . . . .193
Whether or not he was correct that the majority had impeded the Court’s
ability to sustain sexual orientation discrimination in marriage or the military by rejecting the purported immorality of gay people as a legitimate
rationale for government action,194 Justice Scalia’s broader point regarding the limiting effect of norm declarations is well taken.195
The institutional interest theory thus shows how the stare decisis regime encourages fact-based decisions in contexts where norms are unstable. Notably, this theory has force whether one subscribes to the legal
process, legal realist, or cognitive psychological view of adjudication (or
all three, for that matter). A decisionmaking approach that discourages
sweeping rulings can be understood, for example, to reflect a selfconsciously narrow view of judicial power, consistent with legal process
theory’s concerns about the limited capacity of courts. Limited decisions
also protect courts from legitimacy-threatening accusations that they have
overstepped their bounds.
An approach geared toward maximizing flexibility for future decisionmaking likewise fits with the legal realist view that courts are primarily
interested in reaching preferred outcomes. Indeed, the flexibility highlighted by the institutional interest theory dovetails precisely with the interests identified by legal realists. By rendering decisions that focus on
facts rather than norms, courts face reduced pressure to recognize and
reconcile conflicting treatments of the same group across contexts.196
Yet the institutional interest theory has several potential weaknesses
that also warrant consideration. For one, it does not appear to explain
why courts would ever declare norms, if to do so would restrict power.
The theory also arguably overstates the restrictive effect of norm declarations on future exercises of judicial power. The Supreme Court has regularly distinguished away stated normative commitments to the equal treatment of social groups, for example, on the ground that specific facts
related to the group supported the imposition of legal burdens in a par193. 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 589–90.
195. Id. at 605 (“This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if
one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of
this Court.”).
196. The operation of fact-based adjudication and the institutional interest theory
thus add a new layer to our understanding of judicial review. Typically, legal process, legal
realist, and cognitive psychological approaches to adjudication are seen as having little in
common. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:
The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 757, 832–40 (2004) (discussing critical legal studies, Hart and
Sacks’s legal process approach, and cognitive theory approaches as different intellectual
trends). To the extent these approaches are all operationalized via fact-based
adjudication, however, their shared preference to preserve as much future decisionmaking
authority as possible becomes legible.
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ticular context.197 Conversely, one could argue that fact-based decisionmaking reduces rather than preserves judicial power because these types
of decisions can be read more narrowly than norm declarations.
As to the first point, the two-step dynamic set out above in which factbased decisions lay the groundwork for later norm declarations198 shows
that norm declarations tend to restrict future decisionmaking only when
a group’s status is in flux. Once there is general agreement regarding a
social group, courts no longer need the flexibility provided by fact-based
adjudication to sustain burdens in some contexts but not others. The
institutional interest theory thus corresponds to and arguably predicts the
judicial practice of dropping a relatively light anchor that allows for ease
of movement in the future when the normative sea is unfamiliar or contested. Over time, through the accretion of fact-based decisions, courts
gain greater experience with the terrain related to the social group in
question and become better able to gauge the likely effects of a norm
declaration. At that point, but not before, courts may become sufficiently
confident to drop the heavier anchor by stating the underlying norm. Of
course, additional interests, such as a concern with legitimacy, may delay
or inhibit norm declarations even when a court otherwise might be ready
to drop anchor.
In response to the second criticism that the theory overstates the
risks of norm declaration, the point is not that norm declarations absolutely foreclose courts from deciding cases that go against the stated
norm. Rather, decisions that distinguish the stated norm risk being criticized for their overt conflict with prior norm-declaring decisions. Arguable inconsistencies in fact-based decisions, on the other hand, are more
easily distinguished on context alone. The point behind the institutional
interest theory is thus not that norm declarations are absolutely restrictive, but rather that they restrict future decisionmaking to a greater degree than fact-based decisions.
The third critique maintains that the institutional interest theory
misreads fact-based adjudication when it assumes that reliance on facts
expands judicial power. On this view, fact-based decisions should be understood to limit judicial power precisely because they do not hold themselves out as covering ground much beyond the case before the court.
The intuitive appeal of this view, however, gives way when we recall that
all decisions regarding burdens on social groups endorse norms regarding group members. Fact-based decisionmaking simply covers the underlying norm choices, thereby enabling courts to embrace traditional
197. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62–68 (2001) (discussing government
interest in requiring fathers to take more steps than mothers to have their citizenship
conferred upon their children); cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(distinguishing restrictions on gay people in marriage and military from restrictions
related to sexual intimacy by implying that greater factual support exists for state interests
related to national security and marriage).
198. See supra Part II.B.
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group-related norms in one case without explaining away the related decisions that, in effect, reject the same norms. In this sense, fact-based
adjudication helps secure and preserve the decisionmaker’s power to
change the analytic rules applicable to a social group without acknowledging or explaining those changes.
The institutional interest theory thus helps supplement the decisionmaking theories advanced by legal process, legal realist, and socio-psychological schools of thought as an account for the strong pull of fact-based
adjudication. It helps, as well, to set a foundation for the evaluation of
alternate models in Part VI.
VI. ALTERNATIVES

TO

FACT-BASED ADJUDICATION

The flawed premise of fact-based adjudication—that norms can remain outside the decisionmaking process—begs the question whether
greater candor in adjudication might be better.199 As the discussion below shows, candor is double edged; it brings the appeal of transparency,
but it also brings the challenges associated with having courts identify and
declare norms. Yet the current carte blanche for fact-based adjudication
has a double edge as well: it frees courts from explaining how their treatment of a social group in one case relates to different and contradictory
treatment of the same group in another.
This section suggests that a middle-ground approach might soften
these edges while remaining realistic about the entrenched nature of the
current fact-oriented model and the unduly high costs of a full candor
requirement. Under this approach, decisions regarding social groups
that run contrary to treatment of group members in other case law and
legislation would both acknowledge and distinguish the conflicting decisions.200 Courts would not be required, however, to state and defend
their norm choices. Instead, this approach would tolerate fact-based explanations for decisions that sustain apparently conflicting rules regarding group members, reflecting both the institutional interests identified
in Part V and the concern with the particularly elevated costs of candor in
social group litigation that I develop below. After canvassing the costs
and benefits of candor in decisionmaking as a general matter, I consider
how a candor-based decisionmaking model might operate and then apply
199. I discuss alternate definitions of candor in infra notes 205–206 and
accompanying text. My aim here is to explore alternate expository modes of
decisionmaking rather than to cast aspersion on courts that embrace fact-based
adjudication. Within legal scholarship, this type of analysis is typically situated in
considerations of candor, which is why I use that term here even though it does not fit
precisely with the analysis presented.
200. The approach is developed at greater length in infra notes 222–223 and
accompanying text. This proposal has close parallels to the way in which courts are
expected to decide cases generally—by analogizing to and distinguishing related
precedent. As shown earlier, however, the fact-based adjudication model frees courts to
avoid engaging with cases that reflect conflicting views regarding the ways those same facts
affect group members’ status and capacity.

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

2008

unknown

Seq: 54

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

20-NOV-06

13:58

[Vol. 106:1955

the model to the marriage cases with which the Article began. I conclude
that limited modification to the current regime could curtail, although
not resolve fully, some of the problems associated with approaches at either extreme.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Candor
The literature on judicial candor is itself in conflict regarding the
desirability of candor. At one end is the argument that candor is always,
or almost always, preferable.201 From this perspective, obscuring the
“real” reason for decisions is disagreeable as a matter of general principle
and potentially dangerous to the stability and credibility of courts if accepted as a matter of institutional design.202 On the other side is the
argument that candor, in the sense of introspection by judges regarding
the genuine reasons for their decisions, actually might harm the adjudication process by weakening judges’ internalized sense that they are constrained from following personal preferences.203 In between these positions are pragmatic, instrumental arguments suggesting that political and
201. See generally Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930) (arguing that
judges should be understood as having biases and prejudices that influence their
decisions); Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court 251–52 (1964)
(describing “a reputation for candor” as Supreme Court’s “precious political asset”); Scott
C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1307 (1995)
(proposing modified candor requirement); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74
Nw. U. L. Rev. 721 (1979) (arguing that judges should reveal actual grounds of their
decisions); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 827
(1988) (same); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731
(1987) [hereinafter Shapiro, Judicial Candor] (asserting that lack of candor results in
public distrust of judges and prevents public debate over true reasons motivating
decisions).
202. Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Md. L. Rev.
1, 25 (1979) (maintaining that judges are governed by a duty to state their justifications
such that “[i]f justifications cannot be stated in the opinion, they should not be relied
upon in entering the judgment” and disagreeing with other scholars’ acceptance of the
need for “occasional sacrifice” of this principle); cf. Calabresi, supra note 7, at 178–81
(advocating candor but acknowledging that judges experience different constraints than
scholars, while also recognizing that “impossible perfection” in statements of controlling
principles is not required); Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of
Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 Geo. L.J. 121, 155–60 (2006) (discussing
literature on judicial candor within broader analysis of courts’ adjudicative
responsibilities).
203. See generally Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 296 (1990)
(arguing that misguided judges make better decisions than judges with clear
understanding); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Candor of Justice Marshall, 6 Harv. BlackLetter
L.J. 83 (1989) (exploring Justice Marshall’s influence in bringing candor to the Court);
Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 213, 249–57 (1983) (critiquing Calabresi’s call for judicial candor). For a
critique of Altman’s argument, see Gail Heriot, Way Beyond Candor, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
1945, 1945–49 (1991).
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other constraints render candor, even if preferable as a matter of principle, an unrealistic aim.204
In evaluating the desirability of a candor requirement for social
group litigation, I work with a relatively strong definition of candor.
While discussions of candor all focus on “the declarant’s state of
mind,”205 much of the literature expresses the “weak” view that a candor
requirement would be satisfied so long as a judge does not intend to
deceive others.206 Self-deception is treated as a separate issue. The analysis here, however, considers the effects of a strong candor requirement
for courts to articulate all group-related norms implicated by a decision,
whether they are embedded in “thick” facts or associated with “thin” facts.
This would not only foreclose deliberate deception of others, but also
inhibit self-deception by courts lulled into treating facts as sufficient to
explain judgments. Through this approach, I thus mean to reach not
only the cases in which courts deliberately avoid addressing norms, but
also those in which norms are deeply naturalized and seen as inseparable
from fact, as in decisions based on the “natural” ordering of race or sex.
This strong conception of candor assumes that judges are capable of
stating the reasons that underlie their decisions, even if they ordinarily
avoid doing so. Although I observed earlier that norms are often more
difficult to identify than facts and may not be susceptible to precise
description,207 I expect nonetheless that courts could, if pressed, articulate important features of whatever norm governs. Dissenting opinions’
regular exposure and criticism of norms allegedly ignored by the majority
reinforce that the hurdle of norm identification is not insuperable.208 Indeed, even the literature that counsels against a move toward greater candor expects that judges would be able to be more open about the reasons
for their decisions if necessary.
By reining in the relatively unfettered discretion that comes with factbased adjudication, a strong candor requirement could potentially bring
significant benefits to social group litigation beyond satisfying a moral or
intuitive preference for honesty.209 First, greater transparency regarding
decisions’ normative underpinnings likely would result in more fully the204. See Shapiro, Judicial Candor, supra note 201, at 742.
205. Id. at 732.
206. See Altman, supra note 203, at 297 (suggesting distinction between candid,
meaning “never being consciously duplicitous,” and introspective, meaning “critically
examining one’s mental states to avoid any self-deception or error”); Shapiro, Judicial
Candor, supra note 201, at 732 (excluding self-deception from analysis of value of judicial
candor). Earlier literature, such as that of the legal realists, treated the two as more closely
aligned. See Altman, supra note 203, at 297–98 (“Realists urged judges to recognize and to
disclose the motivations that the judges deny . . . .”).
207. See supra Part V.A.1.
208. See supra Part I.B; see also supra note 176.
209. Cf. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (1978)
(considering relationship between lying and morality and effects of lying on individuals
and society).
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orized decisions. Because the current fact-based model enables courts to
sidestep stare decisis constraints, the case law regarding a given social
group often appears to have a random quality, with no overarching theory to explain why burdens are sustained in some areas but not in others.
Courts sustain marriage rules that discriminate against lesbians and gay
men, for example, without reconciling the rest of their jurisprudence that
treats sexual orientation as a nonmaterial difference between people.210
Courts likewise often treat physical differences related to sex and intellectual differences related to mental retardation as significant in some cases
and not in others with a cursory explanation, at best, for the different
treatment of the same characteristics.211 A candor requirement would
pressure courts to recognize and justify these types of divergent trends in
the treatment of social groups from one case to another. To the extent

210. Compare Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359 (2006) (dismissing state
constitutional claim to same-sex marriage because “[i]ntuition and experience suggest that
a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a
man and a woman are like”), with In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398–99 (N.Y. 1995)
(holding that biological mother’s partner can become child’s second parent through
adoption because adoptions would be “fully consistent with the adoption statute” and in
“child’s best interest”). For the same inconsistency in Indiana law, compare In re Infant
Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that Indiana Adoption Act
permits any unmarried couple, regardless of sexual orientation, to file joint petition for
adoption), transfer denied, In re Adoption of M.W., 851 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. 2006), with
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“The State . . . may legitimately
create the institution of opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits accruing to it, in order
to encourage male-female couples to procreate within the legitimacy and stability of a statesanctioned relationship and to discourage unplanned, out-of-wedlock births resulting from
‘casual’ intercourse.”).
211. Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985)
(“It is true that [the mentally retarded] suffer disability not shared by others; but why this
difference warrants a density regulation that others need not observe is not at all
apparent. . . . [R]equiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded . . . .”), with Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 321–24 (1993) (finding that differences between people with mental retardation and
mental illness justify government’s different treatment of two). Justice Souter pointed out
this contradiction in his dissent in Heller, arguing that “Kentucky is being allowed to draw a
distinction that is difficult to see as resting on anything other than the stereotypical
assumption that the retarded are ‘perpetual children,’ an assumption that has historically
been taken to justify the disrespect and ‘grotesque mistreatment’ to which the retarded
have been subjected.” Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454). In the
context of gender differences, compare United States. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996)
(“State actors controlling gates to opportunity, we have instructed, may not exclude
qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males
and females.’” (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 728, 725 (1982))), with
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 66 (2001) (“Facts demonstrate the critical importance of the
Government’s interest in ensuring some opportunity for a tie between citizen father and
foreign born child which is a reasonable substitute for the opportunity manifest between
mother and child at the time of birth.”).
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that theoretical consistency is desirable,212 a candor requirement would
also bring us closer to that goal.
Insistence on greater transparency might function as well to limit
judges’ otherwise relatively unconstrained ability to exercise resultoriented preferences. One can argue that this constraint is more
imagined than real, in that courts could offer “acceptable” norms to mask
the “unacceptable” ones that actually inform a decision just as they cite
selectively to facts. But in some cases, drumming up a passable norm to
justify burdening a particular social group may be either too difficult or
not worth the risk to judicial credibility. For example, as suggested in
Part I.B, the Court in Nguyen might have hesitated to sustain the immigration rule’s preference for mothers over fathers had it faced pressure to
identify and defend the contestable normative link between childbirth
and parenting abilities.213
Openness regarding norms also could enable litigation to proceed
with greater precision. Under current practice, advocates faced with
“thin” factual rationales for discrimination have to first establish that the
“thin” fact stands in for a negative norm and then challenge the norm’s
legitimacy. A candor requirement would put the norms out in the open,
allowing future litigation to focus specifically on the contested norm.
This openness could also provide social change advocates with greater
clarity regarding the norms that are impeding litigation success, which in
turn could prompt more targeted social change efforts.
On the other hand, the arguable gains from candor would come at
the arguably higher cost of reducing the prospects for judicial responsiveness to societal change and diminishing the role of majoritarian bodies in
norm selection. With respect to the integration of social change, greater
candor regarding norms would likely inhibit courts in two interrelated
ways. First, while “thick” facts can be discredited as inaccurate, norms
and intuitions are not typically treated as falsifiable. As a result, they are
not similarly susceptible to disproof or to arguments that reliance on
them is unreasonable or illogical. Explicitly norm-based decisions, in
other words, would be less vulnerable than fact-based decisions to criticism on grounds of inaccuracy. For example, the “thick” fact that gay
people are less able parents than nongay people can be challenged with
an array of relevant studies. While challenges to “thin” facts are more
difficult, for the reasons discussed above, even “thin” fact-based claims
can be met with arguments that the same “thin” facts do not justify legal
burdens on the targeted group in other settings. For example, reliance
on the fact that same-sex couples cannot procreate without third-party
assistance as a rationale for excluding same-sex couples from marriage or
adoption can be challenged as illogical when the same fact is not used to
212. But see Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 18, at 20–21
(questioning benefits of fully theorized decisions).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 65–67.
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justify different treatment of gay people elsewhere in the law, including
in family law. To be sure, an argument that reliance on “thin” facts is
unreasonable is easier to make than to win, given the great deference
with which rational basis review is often applied.214 But even greater deference is accorded to intuitions, which are typically not expected to be
either as logical or as consistently deployed as facts. Ironically, then, lack
of candor regarding norms may create greater opportunities than candid,
norm-declaring decisions for successful, or at least powerful, challenges
to restrictions on group members’ rights.215
To the extent courts are concerned with legitimacy and capacity constraints, a regime requiring discussion of norm choices might also lead to
a decrease in decisions embracing societal change. In part, courts concerned with institutional constraints may fear that by acknowledging their
role in norm selection, they will heighten their exposure to charges of
judicial activism, particularly so when their decisions result in norm shifts.
These charges would be misplaced, of course, since all decisionmaking
regarding social groups involves courts in norm selection. But for courts
sensitive to public perceptions, a requirement of candor regarding norms
will almost certainly chill any inclination to upset the status quo.216
Moreover, as noted earlier, reaching consensus on the specifics of a
norm governing treatment of a social group whose status is in flux may
not be possible either because of substantive or rhetorical disagreement
regarding the characterization of that norm. Consequently, a court
poised to rule for a social group in a fact-based decision that elides these
difficulties might opt to sustain the status quo if norm identification is
required. While decisions that overtly reject negative norms about a social group might be ideal both because they are transparent and because
they create greater possibilities for consistency in the treatment of social
group members, some judicial absorption of societal change, even
through a narrow, fact-based ruling, is arguably preferable to having
courts deliberately insulate themselves from the surrounding society to
ward off accusations of judicial overstepping.217
214. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (holding that burden is on one attacking
legislative enactment to negate every conceivable basis that might support law, regardless
of whether basis has foundation in legislative record); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 820 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying Heller’s articulation of
rational basis standard in adjudication of challenge to Florida’s ban on adoption by gay
prospective parents), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
215. An additional risk for advocates of social change is that a court’s explicit
identification and approval of a negative norm about group members will reify and
strengthen the norm to a greater extent than a decision that affirms the norm implicitly.
216. Although, as noted earlier, the public tends to focus on outcomes, not
reasoning, courts’ explanations for their norm choices are more likely to seep into the
public outcry than courts’ fact-based analyses.
217. The separate question whether courts should insulate themselves from societal
change, at least until the point that new norms have been well settled by nonjudicial actors,
is of course an important one, but it lies beyond this Article’s inquiry, which focuses on the
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From an institutional design standpoint, a candor requirement also
may undesirably limit extrajudicial conversation regarding norms related
to social groups by both the public and other branches of government. A
judicial norm declaration necessarily limits the scope of future legislative
activity because it specifically bars government action based on certain
views of group members.218 Fact-based decisions, by contrast, leave
greater room for public debate and legislative action to engage with and
shape the governing norms regarding a group. Simply put, norm declaration closes doors more definitively than does norm avoidance. Much
like common law decisions are more easily adjustable than constitutional
ones (although neither are fixed absolutely),219 fact-based decisions allow
greater room for future movement than norm-based decisions. In this
way, when making fact-based decisions, particularly in contested normative arenas, courts leave open the possibility that norms will emerge with
greater clarity (and popular acceptance) from other, more representative
bodies.
Related to this point is the idea that, as a society, our commitment to
pluralism extends to norms regarding social groups.220 A certain amount
actual practices of courts in response to social change-based claims. For debate on this
point, see, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 7–18 (1996) (questioning judiciary’s countermajoritarian
reputation); Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That
Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 915, 928 (2006) (“[W]hen
the Court seeks to situate itself at the vanguard of cultural change, it can interrupt the
process by which society arrives at a consensus on its own . . . . Constitutionalizing a matter,
and thereby removing it from democratic politics, also can serve to radicalize
opponents.”); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773, 827–44 (2002) (discussing interaction
between judicial actors and popular opinion); Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical
Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 973 passim (2005) (book review)
(debating judicial insulation in context of Brown v. Board of Education).
218. Judicial affirmation of a traditional norm also raises political risks for a
majoritarian legislature that is inclined to reject that norm by strengthening the claim of
the traditional norm’s defenders that the legislature intends to act based on personal
preferences rather than in response to the majority’s will. Likewise, legislative rejection of
a traditional norm may spark legal challenges and sharpen public criticism by adherents of
the traditional norm.
219. See Kaye, supra note 8, at 16 (“Outside the area of constitutional adjudication,
state court decisions ‘are subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary statute.’ . . . But when
a case is decided on constitutional grounds, the court solidifies the law in ways that may not
be as susceptible to subsequent modification either by courts or by legislatures.” (quoting
Ely, supra note 133, at 4)).
220. See, e.g., Brown-Nagin, supra note 142, at 1466 (describing American democracy
as “pluralist in character”); James Jennings, The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Implications for Challenging Racial
Hierarchy, 40 How. L.J. 597, 613 (1997) (observing that “responses to racial discrimination
in the United States reflect a strong commitment to the idea of pluralism”); Juan F. Perea,
Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and
Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 366 n.529 (1992) (linking “America’s vibrant
cultural pluralism” to “core principles of representative government”).
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of muddiness in that regard reflects not only the instrumental difficulty
inherent in norm identification, but also the desirability of preserving
and encouraging diverse perspectives on social groups and other topics.
Pressure to articulate clear, definitive norms, even in adjudication, would
run contrary to this overarching political and jurisprudential
commitment.
Given these costs, a strict candor requirement is ill-suited to replace
the fact-based adjudication model, even with that model’s serious
flaws.221 The question then is whether another approach might bring to
adjudication some of the benefits of the candor requirement without all
of its shortcomings.
B. Candid Fact-Based Adjudication as a Decisionmaking Model
Although fact-based adjudication appears to be the lesser of two evils
relative to a full candor requirement, the question remains whether the
current approach can be adjusted to constrain judges from freely disregarding connections among social group cases involving related
norms.222 This subsection offers an alternate model of candid fact-based
adjudication that tries to achieve some middle ground. It then applies
the model to cases involving marriage recognition claims by same-sex
couples both to gauge its effectiveness and to identify potential risks and
problems associated with its use.
1. The Contours of Candid Fact-Based Adjudication. — In a nutshell, the
model proposed here would require courts to recognize the connections
among cases involving the same social group, drawing from a candor
model. At the same time, drawing from fact-based adjudication, the
model would leave in place the current leeway for courts to reconcile or
distinguish related cases by reference to facts rather than to the norms
that inform the valuation of the facts. Put another way, a norm shift embodied in a decision in one case (Case A) would not require the next case
involving the same social group (Case B) to make the same norm shift.
However, a court deciding Case B could not elide Case A’s treatment of
221. The position impels important questions about whether adjudication that avoids
full disclosure and defense of underlying normative choices should ever be tolerated and,
further, about the scope and extent of candor that should be expected of judges who are
sensitive to the role of norms in their decisionmaking. In the interests of focusing on the
problem at hand, I will set aside the broadest iterations of these questions and concentrate
here on their application in the context of claims that courts should integrate societal
change.
222. Indeed, complete and deliberate failure to wrestle with dissonant positions
regarding a social group in related cases arguably amounts to duplicity rather than benign
neglect. I take this position cognizant of Karl Llewellyn’s point that a determined court
can distinguish precedent in a variety of ways. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition: Deciding Appeals 75–76 (1960). Llewellyn assumes, for the most part, that
precedent will be distinguished, not ignored. See id. Forcing exposure to related
precedent on a consistent basis is a check, even if an imperfect one, against judicial
duplicity. See id.
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social group facts. Instead, if the court in Case B reaches a different conclusion than Case A about whether social group facts can justify a legal
burden, the proposed model would require the court to explain the different valuation of the facts from one setting to another.
This requirement would be triggered in any instance that a court
identifies facts about the social group as a reason for sustaining a legal
restriction. It would also be triggered when Case A invalidates a restriction on group members, thereby indicating that no group-related facts
justify imposition of legal burdens, and Case B relies on group-related
facts as a basis for upholding a discriminatory rule.223 I describe this
model as requiring fact-based candor because reliance on facts is permitted, but different treatment of the same facts in similar cases must be
acknowledged and defended.
2. Implications of a Fact-Based Candor Requirement. — Predicting the
effect, if any, of the fact-based candor approach is, of course, a challenging task. Conceivably, the proposed approach, like a complete candor
requirement, could dissuade some courts from rejecting traditional rationales regarding a social group because they would have to expose inconsistencies between the new holdings and prior rulings. On the other
hand, like many legal rules, it may have little effect on the actual decisionmaking process even as it influences the way opinions are written. If, for
example, a judge has always relied on a Karl Llewellyn-style situation
sense224 to distinguish one setting from another, the model’s insistence
on engagement with conflicting norms may alter a decision’s text but not
the underlying reasoning.
Likewise, we might conclude that having courts recognize and explain conflicting views regarding the same social group’s status or capacity will undermine norm pluralism. Alternately, we might find that this
approach strengthens and fosters pluralism by acknowledging that competing views regarding a group may both be valid. Judicial recognition of
diverse views also may create additional incentives for the public and its
223. The converse assumption would not necessarily be true. If the court in Case A
sustained a restriction based on particular facts, the court also might have had in mind
additional facts about the social group that justified the burden imposed, but did not need
to articulate them because the stated facts were sufficient to support the outcome.
224. That sense, although not defined specifically in Llewellyn’s own work, has been
well described as a “‘process of thinking’ that considers ‘the implications of various legal
rules, matched up against reasonably intricate models of social situations, and brought
together in light of the force of all the claims to be made.’” Jon Hanson & David Yosifon,
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 293 n.573 (2003) (quoting Todd D.
Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts of “Default Rules” and “Situation Sense,” in Good
Faith and Fault in Contract Law 191, 214 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995)).
On Llewellyn’s situation sense, see also Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 Am. U. L.
Rev. 307, 373 n.347 (2005); David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 842, 842–46 (1999). For an extensive critique, see Hanson & Yosifon, supra, at
293–99.
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representatives to debate the relative merits of conflicting positions in
extrajudicial settings.
Because the marriage cases brought by same-sex couples make
claims based on societal change and arise against a backdrop of other
decisions and legislation involving the social group of lesbians and gay
men, they can usefully illuminate the fact-based candor model’s effects
on and implications for adjudication. In particular, the cases let us test
how evaluation of the “procreation” rationale for exclusionary marriage
laws might be affected by a modified candor requirement.225 This rationale, which has been accepted by numerous courts as discussed earlier,
holds that marriage may be limited to different-sex couples because those
couples can, in theory if not always in reality, procreate without thirdparty assistance.226
225. For examples of state rationales that implicate procreation, see, e.g., Goodridge
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (“The department posits three
legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying: (1) providing a
‘favorable setting for procreation’; (2) ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing . . .
define[d] as ‘a two-parent family with one parent of each sex’; and (3) preserving scarce
State and private financial resources.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999) (“[W]e
must identify the governmental purpose or purposes to be served by the statutory
classification. The principal purpose the State advances in support of the excluding [sic]
same-sex couples from the legal benefits of marriage is the government’s interest in
‘furthering the link between procreation and child rearing.’”).
226. Courts often characterize the procreation rationale as reflecting the essence of
marriage rather than as expressing a view about the social group of gay people. When the
procreation rationale is set against the background of marriage case law and statutes,
however, it becomes clear that the law of marriage does not now, and has never, treated
procreation as an essential element. See Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation,
and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1089, 1108–19 (2002).
Several courts have gone further to suggest that marriage is necessary to impose order
on heterosexual procreation, something not needed for same-sex couples whose
procreation is necessarily more deliberate. See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (opining that couples who invest time and money in adoption or
assisted reproduction do not need marriage because they already have “high level of
financial and emotional commitment” toward their children, while “procreation by
‘natural’ reproduction may occur without any thought for the future”); Hernandez v.
Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359 (2006) (concluding that risk of accidental procreation justifies
providing marriage to different-sex couples, but not same-sex couples, to ensure children’s
welfare).
Today, economic interdependence is widely acknowledged as the primary function of
civil marriage. In fact, civil marriage has always been an economic relationship between
the spouses, although during coverture, the relationship entailed the merger of a married
woman’s legal identity into the identity of her husband. Emotional interdependence and
childrearing are also occasionally recognized as important in the public discourse and, at
times, in domestic relations jurisprudence. Procreation, on the other hand, has been
specifically disavowed as a marital requirement, as indicated by marriage eligibility rules,
annulment law, and constitutional protections for a woman’s right to terminate a
pregnancy, even absent her husband’s consent. And, of course, procreation outside of
marriage has been given strong constitutional protection. Borten, supra, at 1108–19; see
also Suzanne B. Goldberg, A Historical Guide to the Future of Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples, 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 249, 252 (2006).
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The fact-based adjudication model allows courts to hold out procreation as a stand-alone rationale, notwithstanding that the “thin” biological
facts regarding procreative capacity cannot, without more, explain the
law’s preference for heterosexual relationships over same-sex partnerships.227 The proposed model likewise would not require courts to define the norms for which the procreation rationale stands in. Courts also
would not have to provide a normative account for why the facts of procreation would be significant with respect to marriage even as they are
not relied on to justify distinctions based on sexual orientation in other
contexts.228 The proposed model would, however, require a court that
intended to cite these “thin” facts as a basis for upholding the marriage
law to acknowledge that procreative capacity had not previously been
found to support distinctions between gay and nongay adults generally,
or parents in particular.229
These past rulings would not automatically preclude the court from
relying on procreative capacity to justify the marriage exclusion, but they
would require a court to explain, whether by reference to facts or norms,
the relevance of the different capacity for procreation of same- and different-sex couples to marriage given its irrelevance to other contexts.230
227. It is difficult to take seriously, in light of common sense as well as the legislative
framework and case law concerning marriage, the suggestion that the way in which egg
and sperm meet is more fundamental to marriage than the lifetime of parenting
responsibilities of the adult partners after childbirth. Even if we do treat the claim,
arguendo, as a serious one, the biological facts of procreation do not themselves explain
the limitation of marriage to couples who may be able to procreate together without thirdparty assistance. Instead, this type of procreative capacity must be judged to be “better”
than or preferable to other techniques for having children (or, alternately, worse for
children, as the “accidental reproduction” argument suggests) if it is to be treated as a
legitimate reason to exclude from marriage a subset of otherwise eligible adult couples.
228. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
229. For example, in cases involving custody or visitation, courts in most states have
held that a parent’s sexual orientation matters only when there is evidence that the
parent’s behavior is causing harm to the children. See Patricia M. Logue, The Facts of Life
for Gay and Lesbian Parents: Compelling Equal Treatment Under the Law, Fam. Advoc.,
Fall 2002, at 43, 44 (“In recent years, even states generally considered socially conservative
on issues of homosexuality and parenting have disclaimed any per-se rule restricting
custody for lesbian or gay parents on the basis of sexual orientation alone.”).
230. As discussed in supra note 226, some courts have tried to do this by arguing that
heterosexuals are less likely to be responsible parents because they are more likely to
procreate accidentally. This argument fails standard equal protection review, which asks
not whether there is good reason to include the protected group but rather whether a
legitimate reason exists to exclude the burdened group, but this error in legal reasoning is
outside our scope here. For further discussion of this type of flawed equal protection
analysis, see generally Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, supra note 106.
A court alternately might determine, as some courts have, that the reason for the
different treatment is not procreative capacity per se, but rather the preferable
childrearing environment provided by heterosexual couples. Again, however, the court
would have to explain why the household headed by a heterosexual couple is preferable to
the household headed by a lesbian or gay couple when, in the context of custody and
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Objections might be made that the proposed model would do little
more than require courts to gesture generally at why a fact like procreative capacity means something different for the status of gay people in
relation to marriage than it does in many other contexts. Pointing to
superficial differences between marriage and other contexts would arguably be an easy way to escape the model’s insistence that different treatment of the same facts be explained. But, in the model’s defense, the
insistence that courts acknowledge the variable treatment of the same
social group-related facts provides more discipline than the current factbased adjudication approach, which permits the different treatment to go
entirely unmentioned. Moreover, in some cases, forcing exposure even
of the fact-related reasoning potentially may cause courts to rethink their
analysis.
Another objection to the proposal would be that even an insistence
on minimal candor will tip courts away from embracing “new” facts about
social groups if they have to show that their use of a fact deviates from
previous uses. In practice, however, the model’s proposal that courts candidly acknowledge their different treatment of social-group facts parallels
the way that courts typically highlight “new” understandings of facts when
tipping from one view of a social group’s capacity to another. If anything,
the proposed model would intensify scrutiny of courts that adhere to
“old” facts about a social group that have not been found sufficient to
justify legal burdens on group members in related contexts.
C. Candid Fact-Based Adjudication and Institutional Design
The candid fact-based adjudication model also may bear on a separate set of concerns regarding the judiciary’s role as a nonmajoritarian
body engaged in adjudicating cases involving profound social conflicts.
Often, this concern is advanced through a “leave it to the legislature”
argument, which maintains that courts should not displace a traditional
rule regarding a social group when views about group members are in the
midst of public debate.231 The fact-based adjudication model leaves
courts free to disregard the flux in society’s treatment of group members
and focus narrowly on facts related to the rule in question. The proposed
visitation jurisprudence, sexual orientation is deemed irrelevant to parenting ability. See
Logue, supra note 229, at 44–45.
231. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(“[I]t is for the people of Arizona, through their elected representatives or by using the
initiative process, rather than this court, to decide whether to permit same-sex
marriages.”); Brief for Respondents State of New York & Department of Health & for
Attorney General as Intervenor in Hernandez at 2, Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d 338 (No. 86), 2006
WL 1930167 (“The formulation of social policy regarding same-sex marriage should be
preceded by the kind of debate that is the very hallmark of the legislative process.”). For
decisions that have adopted this argument to dismiss calls for marriage rights for same-sex
couples, see supra note 5.

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\COL\106-8\COL801.txt

2006]

unknown

Seq: 65

CONSTITUTIONAL TIPPING POINTS

20-NOV-06

13:58

2019

model, in contrast, suggests that courts consider the rule and its rationales in the context of the broader body of legislation and public policy
that also speaks to the status of the social group. Again, the marriage
cases aid in crystallizing the competing views of institutional design embodied in the two approaches.
In every state where marriage litigation has been brought, the legislature has not only expressed views about the relevance of procreative capacity to marriage generally,232 but also about the relevance of sexual
orientation to parenting. Legislative frameworks regarding adoption, foster care, guardianship, and other parental-type relationships all consider
intently the qualities that adults must have to care for children under the
state’s control or supervision. If the state believed that certain facts
caused gay adults to be undesirable as parents, then surely we would expect to see restrictions on their ability to parent in these arenas.233 Indeed, if the state’s view is that couples capable of procreating without
assistance make better parents than other couples, then we would expect
that, too, to be reflected in these laws. But procreation-focused prohibitions do not exist and restrictions on gay adults as foster or adoptive parents exist only as outliers.234 Moreover, courts in many of these states
have authorized second-parent adoptions so that both parents in a samesex couple can establish a legal relationship with the children they are
raising.235 And in none of these states has the legislature acted to over232. Domestic relations law in states across the country makes clear that a couple’s
capacity to procreate without assistance is neither necessary nor sufficient as a marriage
qualification. See supra note 226.
233. For an example of one of the few states with law on this issue, see, e.g., Lofton v.
Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004) (sustaining
Florida’s ban on adoption by lesbian and gay adults), reh’g en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005). For a critique of the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Lofton, see, e.g., Mark Strasser, Rebellion in the Eleventh Circuit: On
Lawrence, Lofton, and the Best Interests of Children, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 421 passim (2005)
(arguing that Eleventh Circuit failed to account for Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence
v. Texas).
We might also expect to see prohibitions on gay adults serving as role models for
children, whether as teachers, coaches, or leaders of youth organizations, yet no state has
in place anything of the kind.
234. See Logue, supra note 229, at 44; see also supra note 233.
235. See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(“Allowing continuation of the rights of both the biological and adoptive parent, where
compelled by the best interests of the child, is the only rational result.”); In re the
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(“‘[T]his Court finds a child who has all of the above benefits and two adults dedicated to
his welfare, secure in their loving partnership, and determined to raise him to the very best
of their considerable abilities. There is no reason . . . to obstruct such a favorable
situation.’” (quoting In re the Adoption of a Child Whose First Name Is Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d
997, 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1992))); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (“This policy [of
promoting child’s best interest] would certainly be advanced in situations like those
presented here by allowing the two adults who actually function as a child’s parents to
become the child’s legal parents.”).
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turn a second-parent adoption ruling on the ground that same-sex
couples should not be encouraged to parent.236
If courts are pressed to acknowledge conflicting legislative as well as
case law-based views of social groups, then any decision upholding a distinction based on sexual orientation, including in marriage, for example,
must identify and explain why no other rules treat sexual orientationrelated differences as material.
Of course, an approach that requires legislative consistency—or at
least the ability to provide credible explanations for different legislative
rules—is in tension with the widely held view that legislatures need freedom to move incrementally, which necessarily means that they need not
act with complete consistency, as Justice Scalia observed in his Lawrence
dissent.237 But a requirement that courts acknowledge conflicting treatment of social group members in legislation is not a requirement that
legislatures must act in lockstep or be rebuked by courts for failing to do
so.238 In the marriage cases, then, if all other distinctions based on sexual
orientation have been removed from statutes and case law, their retention in marriage law can be seen as the final vestiges of longstanding hostility toward the social group at issue.239 Such a proposal would be futile
since laws often reflect a diversity of norms regarding social groups and
legislatures typically do not focus coherent attention on a social group
across issues.240
Also, under the proposed model, courts would retain the authority
to decide whether and how far to carry a norm from one context to another. The point here is simply that if social group characteristics are
treated as relevant in one setting and not in another, courts must acknowledge and explain the different treatment.
Moreover, because legislatures tend to respond more quickly to societal change than courts, “new” views regarding social groups ordinarily

236. Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 Drake L.
Rev. 861, 877 (2006) (finding it “striking that the second-parent adoption cases have
produced nothing like the opposition that has greeted same-sex marriage decisions”).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 192–193.
238. Indeed, courts need not look to legislation at all. While legislation, like case law,
may provide useful insight into the settling of norms that are related directly to the
rationale being considered by a court, the candor requirement conceivably could be
limited to case law.
239. Cf. Lewis v. Harris, No. A-68-05, 2006 N.J. LEXIS 1521, at *60 (N.J. Oct. 25, 2006)
(“New Jersey’s Legislature has been at the forefront of combating sexual orientation
discrimination and advancing equality of treatment toward gays and lesbians.”).
240. Ely, supra note 133, at 129 (“I’m skeptical that a method of forcing articulation
of purposes [by legislatures] can be developed that will be both workable and helpful.”);
Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 233–35 (1976) (arguing
that nature of lawmaking process renders legislative intent difficult to discern).
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will be reflected in statutes well before courts begin adjudicating constitutional claims. In the marriage cases, then, if all other distinctions based
on sexual orientation have been removed from statutes and case law,
their retention in marriage law can be seen as the final vestiges of longstanding hostility toward the social group at issue. From this perspective,
courts seem particularly well suited, as enforcers of equal protection and
other constitutional guarantees, to identify and prohibit discriminatory
rules that rest on animus, arbitrariness, or other impermissible
purposes.241
Of course, it is also possible that the exclusionary law’s survival in the
face of other changes demonstrates not that some failure requiring judicial intervention has occurred, but rather that the interaction of marriage
and same-sex couples is somehow different from all other law related to
sexual orientation. But if that is the claim, it ought to be defended. To
the extent that the contemporary approach of fact-based adjudication
safeguards courts from the demand to defend, it presents not merely a
pragmatic mode of analysis, but also a cover for result-oriented decisionmaking that should not be countenanced.
CONCLUSION
Wherever one comes out on the ultimate question of how much account courts should take of societal change, the constant involvement of
courts in assessing social norms cannot reasonably be ignored. Courts
evaluate and select among competing norms related to the status and
capacity of social groups on a regular basis, even when those norms are
contested and even when courts’ normative choices go unacknowledged.
Consequently, the presumption made by many courts, elected officials, and commentators that courts avoid influencing norm contests
when they reject social change-based claims is misconceived. It is the fiction of fact-based adjudication, not a unique aptitude of courts to make
decisions without normative choices, that enables judgments to be made

241. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–35 (1996) (identifying animus as
impermissible purpose for government action); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973) (holding that dislike or disapproval of politically unpopular group could
not justify legislative classification); cf. Ely, supra note 133, at 73–104 (discussing need for
judicial review to protect against legislature’s failures to adequately represent groups
lacking majoritarian support). Consider, for example, the refusal of some legislatures to
repeal sodomy prohibitions even after judicial invalidation. See, e.g., Cassandra M.
DeLaMothe, Note, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital Exemption for All Sex
Offenses in New York’s Penal Law, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 857, 885 n.173 (1996) (“[I]n
1980, the New York Court of Appeals declared [New York’s law criminalizing certain
noncommercial sexual conduct between consenting adults] unconstitutional as a violation
of the right to privacy in People v. Onofre. To date, the statute remains on the books.”
(citation omitted)).
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without mention of norms. Our theories of judicial review will be better
off, both with respect to descriptive accuracy and normative bite, to the
extent they embrace, rather than overlook, this reality.

